UIC Law Review
Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 2

Spring 2003

The (Pre) (As) Sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding
Arbitration Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and
Expectations of Transactional Lawyers, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 589
(2003)
Celeste M. Hammond
John Marshall Law School, hammondc@uic.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Legal
Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As) Sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration Contracts: An
Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional Lawyers, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 589 (2003)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss3/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

A REAL ESTATE FOCUS
THE (PRE) (AS) SUMED "CONSENT" OF
COMMERCIAL BINDING ARBITRATION
CONTRACTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS OF
TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS
CELESTE

M. HAMMOND*

In enthusiastically
enforcing
pre-dispute
arbitration
provisions,' American courts have emphasized the "voluntary"
nature of the parties' consent to substitute arbitration in lieu of
litigation. Richard Reuben's recent article analyzes what is
required for the "actual assent" he sees as the basis for a
democratic, constitutionally sound place for arbitration in the
broader system of justice.!
Some courts, legislatures, and interested professional
organizations have suggested that where consumers, employees,
and other unsophisticated persons are parties to contracts with
'Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Real Estate Law, The John
Marshall Law School. J.D. University of Chicago Law School. The author
acknowledges the valuable assistance of Tony Longo, J.D. 2004 and Jonathan
Chapman, Stanley Marion Fellow in Real Estate Law LLM 2003; her
colleagues Professors Susan Connor, Linda Crane, and Ann Lousin, Virginia
Harding of Gould & Ratner, Carol Rose and Michael Heise. The author wishes
to thank especially Dean R. Gilbert Johnston who provided financial resources
and encouragement for the empirical research in addition to his comments
from his perspective as a litigator. The author appreciates most of all the love
of her husband, Michael Pensack.
1. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 WIS.L. REV. 33, 54 (1997) (using the term "compelled arbitration" to refer
to situations where a party agreed to arbitrate future disputes but, once the
dispute arose, would prefer to litigate rather than arbitrate).
2. Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Howsam and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration
Provisions (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and The S.M.U. Law
Review). See Wright v. Universal Maritime, 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (requring
that a waiver of statutor rights by a labor union must be "clear and
unmistakeable"). In Wright, individual members of the union were seeking to
waive rights on behalf of the entire labor union. Id.
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businesses, the "voluntariness" of pre-dispute arbitration clauses
in contracts is open to question and should be reviewable by the
courts.3
Yet, because attorneys for business clients misunderstand the
basics of arbitration as a dispute resolution process, the predispute binding arbitration provisions of their clients' agreements
may not actually be "voluntary" and may lack the consent required
to make a promise into a legally enforceable contract.'
Such
attorneys are not equipped to counsel their clients "at the front
end" in eliminating or modifying arbitration clauses to correspond
with their clients' expectations and needs.'
Empirical research has rarely been used to examine the
understanding of the arbitration process or the expectations of
transactional attorneys concerning arbitration. The Hammond
survey of those members of a large metropolitan bar association,
whose practice is primarily transactional in nature, about their
knowledge and expectations about binding arbitration in
commercial disputes, indicates confusion and misinformation
about the process of the law of arbitration.
The thesis of this article is not that transactional attorneys
perpetrate legal malpractice when they advise business clients
about pre-dispute arbitration provisions.6 Instead, the thesis is
that where the lawyer, as advisor/counselor, is egregiously
incorrect in her own understanding and expectations, the client
has not "knowingly" assented to arbitration and the agreement to
arbitrate is not legally enforceable.7

3. See generally Schwartz, supra note 1, at 40-70 (criticizing this process).
4. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 304 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory] (defining the consent
required as a "manifestation of the intention to alienate rights."). See also
Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1022 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, Contract as Promise] (setting forth a
brief summary of the differing views of contracts).
5. See generally Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution
Clauses in High Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.

L. 107 (2002) (discussing the negotiation theories that lawyers have for their
clients).
6. There are no reported cases involving a claim of legal malpractice
because an attorney advised a client to enter into binding arbitration.
7. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 4, at 307-09, nn.155-58 (setting

forth the limits of the objective approach to consent needed to form a legally
enforceable contract where there is "proof of different subjective
understanding of one or both parties.").
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CONSENT IS THE BASIS FOR ENFORCING PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

A. Public Policy FavoringArbitrationAgreements
Even for the accidental tourist of case law that discusses the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),8 it is not difficult to realize how
jealously American courts have guarded arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution over the past twenty years.9 Courts rest easy in
their jealousy due to the presumed voluntary nature, also termed
"knowing consent,"10 of private contracts containing pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. When this consent may be lacking for any
number of reasons, the court will fall back on a broad
interpretation of the FAA, even though, as one commentator has
recently described, the Act is really a legislative compromise
undeserving of such a liberal reading. 1 Despite such criticisms,
the broad interpretations of the FAA have pervaded federal court
adjudication. This highly dependable trend, however, has been
limited by at least two federal courts in recent years.
In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the Ninth Circuit
held that section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 prevents an
employer from conditionally hiring individuals as long as they give
consent to waive their right to bring future Title VII cases in
court. 12 Likewise, in Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith Inc., a Massachusetts District Court ruled the same way
concerning section 118."3 "These decisions are, however, at least at
present, exceptions to the general rule permitting mandatory
arbitration of such claims."14
8. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
9. See Jean Sternlight, Pancea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking The
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637,
660-63, 711 (1996) (commenting that the Supreme Court has developed a
consistent pattern since 1983 of favoring arbitration over litigation).
10. See id. at 662-63.
See also Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Arbitration:A return to first principles (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author and The Duke Law Journal) (theorizing that the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3), states that arbitration clauses waiving all
legal rights and remedies is a term unanticipated by contract law and thus
should be excluded from agreements).
11. Reuben, supra note 2, at 21.
12. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.

1998).
13. Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 995 F.Supp.
190, 212 (D. Mass 1998), vacated by 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7793 (1st Cir.
1999).
14. Jean Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under The Civil
Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L.
REV. 273, 317-18 (1999). See Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d. Cir.
N.Y. 1999) (criticizing Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182); Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 230 F.3d 231, 239-41 (6th Cir. 2000) (criticizing Rosenberg, 995
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Regardless of the rare occasion where a federal court
practices self-restraint and questions the elasticity of the FAA, the
federal policy favoring arbitration is both a dominating and
intimidating force in modern dispute resolution. As mentioned
above, parties who contract for binding arbitration are presumed
by the courts to have consented to the submission of the claim to
arbitration. However, courts have not seemed overtly concerned
with whether such consent is legally justifiable in a contractual
sense.15 Rather, the courts have been distracted by the seductive
avenue arbitration as a means to relieve burdensome dockets.
B. Extremely Limited Grounds for Reviewing Awards
It is this same presumed contractual consent to binding
arbitration of future disputes that has persuaded courts that they
should not vacate arbitral awards except on very limited grounds.
Both the FAA and the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) statutorily
contain very few, closely guarded, grounds for vacatur of an
arbitrator's award.
1.

Grounds for Vacatur: The FAA

The FAA 1" lists only four grounds for vacatur of an arbitral
award. 7 Briefly, the four grounds are (1) arbitrator corruption, fraud or
undue means; (2) evident partiality; (3) misconduct or misbehavior; and (4)
misuse of power. These narrow grounds 8 for vacatur have not been an
F.Supp. 190).

15. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 58 (discussing the significance of the

"apparent embrace of implied consent to arbitrability").
16. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
17. Id. The statute stresses the limited nature of avenues for vacatur in the
following language:
(a) In any of the following cases, the United States court for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award

upon the application of any party to the arbitration(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue

means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to

postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party may have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.

Id.
18. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)
(holding that judicial review of arbitration award is more limited than that of

trial). Arbitrators are not bound by rules of evidence and may draw on their
personal knowledge in making award, and swearing of witnesses may not be
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impressive avenue for relief from an unfavorable arbitral award. A brief
peek at some case law illustrates the challenge a party faces when
attempting to seek a vacatur of an adverse award.
The first ground for vacatur under the FAA is corruption, fraud or
undue means.19 In Local Union 1160 v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Centers, 9 the
court found no undue means when the defendant apparently threatened
one of the witnesses.21 The court noted that the arbitrator put little stock
in that witness's testimony and ultimately held that the incident was not
undue means under the FAA." The court also made a clear distinction
between the actions of parties and those of the arbitrator.2 The judge
ruled that the grounds for vacatur at issue, in this case, undue means,
focused on the actions of the arbitrator, not the parties. 4
The second ground for vacatur under the FAA, evident partiality, is
likewise a challenging case to make against the entry of an adverse
arbitral award. In InternationalProducev. A/S Rosshavet, the court held
that standard of "evident partiality" contained in the FAA,21 which
would authorize vacating arbitration award due to bias of the
arbitrator, is not made out by mere appearance of bias. 2' For
example, Hoffman v. Bargill, Inc. is a case where the movant
failed to establish more than the mere appearance of bias.2 7 The
holding, though intuitively questionable, remained true to the
limited vacatur opportunities for dissatisfied arbitral parties. 8 In
Hoffman, the movant grain-seller demonstrated to the court that
the arbitrators who ruled in favor of the opponent grain-buyer
were themselves all grain-buying executives. 9 In all fairness to
the court, the movant failed to show any other evidence of
impartial motivation other than the coincidence of occupation. °
This case illustrates the limited application of grounds for vacatur
under the FAA.
The third ground for vacatur under the FAA is misconduct or
misbehavior.2" In Riko Enterprises, Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics
Corp., the court vacated the arbitration award after finding
arbitrator
misconduct
and misbehavior where the

required, and arbitrators need not disclose facts or reasons behind award. Id.
at n.4.
19. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
20. 616 F.Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa, 1985).
21. Id at 814.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
26. 638 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir. 1981).
27. Hoffman v. Carghill Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 861, 863 (N.D. Iowa 1999).

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 9 U.S.C. § 10(3) (2000).
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Commissioner of the National Basketball Association, acting
as an arbitrator, failed to conduct a hearing and refused to
allow the party charged with misconduct to rebut charges
with evidence.32 More misconduct and misbehavior was
found apparent in Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local
1115 Joint Bd., the arbitrator was clearly aware of a
legitimate and serious illness of a party's key witness, but
still refused to grant a requested adjournment.3" A final
example can be found in Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v.
North American Towing, Inc., where the court found that an
ex parte receipt of evidence by the arbitrators bearing on the
amount of the award to be made amounted to misbehavior
or misconduct.3

'

These examples

illustrate the type of

misbehavior needed to disallow the rubber-stamping of
arbitral awards. The misconduct or misbehavior must be
egregious.
The fourth and final statutory ground for vacatur in the
FAA is misuse of power.3" Western Employers Ins. Co. v.
Jeffries & Co., explained that, when a party is forced into
arbitration according to terms for which it did not bargain,
it will be construed as a misuse of power.36 In Marshall v.
Green Giant Co., the court held that manifest disregard of
the law is a misuse of arbitrator power and will establish a
basis for vacating an arbitration award where it is shown
that the arbitrator knew the law, the law was clearly
defined, and the arbitrator decided to ignore the law.37
In summary, these four grounds for vacatur 8 center on
the acts of the arbitrator rather than the parties
themselves. Because of this focus, the grounds for vacatur
listed above have become known as "among the narrowest
known to law."39 Moreover, even these grounds for vacatur
may lack meaning because of the separability doctrine,
which treats the pre-dispute arbitration provision as part of

32. Riko Enterprises, Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp. 357 F. Supp.
521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

33. Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local 1115 Joint Bd., 377 F.
Supp. 1208, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
34. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North American Towing,
Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1979).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 10(4) (2000).

36. Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Jeffries & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 262
(9th Cir. 1992).
37. Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991).
38. See Stephan L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards
and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 443,

461-96 (1998) (discussing the non-statutory grounds for vacatur).
39. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1995).
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the larger contract. Regardless of the enforceability of that
larger contract, the arbitration provision is treated as a
"separate" contract to which the parties are presumed to
have consented. Thus, any challenges to the main contract
will be considered by an arbitrator and not a court, without
the protections of legal rules." Courts would only "decide
whether the arbitration clause itself is valid and
enforceable . . ."
7. This is an interesting commentary on
the state of arbitration; when one understands how
tenuously the federal preference for arbitration flows from
the presumed consent of arbitral parties, the manifest
injustice of such limited grounds for vacatur almost shocks
the conscience.
2. Grounds for Vacatur: The UAA, RUAA and OtherApplicable
State Law
Even egregious, unanticipated arbitral outcomes do not
seem to affect the enforceability of the award due to the
initial "voluntariness" of the consent to enter into a contract
that contains an arbitration clause."
For example, in
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., the California
Supreme Court refused to reverse an arbitration award that
gave the petitioner a royalty-free, licensed use of an Intel
product even though it was not at issue in the arbitration.43
The court explained, "the remedy an arbitrator fashions
does not exceed his or her powers if it bears a rational
relationship
to
the
underlying
contract
as
interpreted ....

"

The

dissenting justices

noted

that

"under the majority's test it is theoretically possible for an
arbitrator to order the losing party to be placed in the
stocks or pillory or to direct that the contractual
relationship be repaired by ordering the marriage of the
parties' first-born children.
Murray Levin recently articulated the same sentiments
when he expressed his amazement at how little attention
40. Reuben, supra note 2, at 48.

This doctrine was enunciated by the

United States Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.

Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
41. Reuben, supra note 2, at 9.
42. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L. J.
425, 430-57 (1988). Although, as does the FAA, the UAA permits vacatur in
cases of prejudicial misconduct by an arbitrator, neither statute contains
grounds for reversal due to the arbitrariness or capriciousness of the
arbitrator's decision. Research has revealed no general arbitration statute in
any state that contains such language. Id. at 437.
43. 885 P.2d 994, 996 (Cal. 1994).
44. Id. at 996.
45. Id. at 1014, n.2.
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was paid to the rule of law by the courts.4'
Likewise,
Stephen Hayford has suggested that reasoned arbitral
awards, or the lack thereof, are in need of a reorientation to
the vacatur grounds by calling for
a reassessment of the contemporary paradigm for commercial
arbitration whereby the threat of judicial vacatur effectively
precludes the use of reasoned arbitration awards. After reviewing
the nature and effect of the statutory and nonstatutory grounds for
vacatur and critiquing the current case law interpreting and
applying those standards, a new paradigm for commercial
arbitration is proposed. That model centers on a redefined
relationship between reasoned awards and the judicial standards for
vacatur."7
With calls for reform abounding in the field of binding
commercial arbitration under the FAA, a serious look must be
taken at the presumed consent of the arbitral parties. It is from
this presumed consent that courts have led parties down a
compulsory path that will ultimately end in a failed attempt to
vacate an unappealing award barring an exotic circumstance. The
problems with the end lie in the beginning.

II. QUESTIONS ABOUT CONSENT TO THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN
CONSUMER, EMPLOYEE, AND FRANCHISE CONTRACTS: ADHESION
AND UNCONSCIONABILITY

Where consumers, employees, and other unsophisticated
persons are parties to contracts with businesses, especially where
the terms of the contract are mandated by the business, the
"voluntary nature" of pre-dispute arbitration clauses is open to
question.
The governing statutory law for arbitration disputes is
primarily the FAA.48 Scholars have noted that the FAA "was
envisioned as applying to consensual transactions between two
merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, and not necessarily
to transactions between a large merchant and a much weaker and
less knowledgeable consumer."49 However, clauses mandating
arbitration are now found in contracts as varied as those involving
sales contracts for consumer household goods and pre-employment
agreements."
The consumer or employee often enters the

46. Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration
and The Importance of Volition. 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 105, 117-18 (1997).
47. Hayford, supra note 38, at 443.
48. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
49. Sternlight, supra note 9, at 647.
50. Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjucatory Boat Without a Keel: Private
Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IowA L. REV.
1337, 1341 (2002).
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agreement without giving "voluntary, knowing consent."5 This
lack of true consent is often due to the weaker party having no
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract or any realistic
opportunity to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract. 2 This
lack of choice often results in "consent" to boilerplate provisions
that dictate arbitration terms limiting the rights of the weaker
party and defeating the expectation of fairness. 3
A. Most Courts Uphold ArbitrationAgreements
On occasion, courts have held that arbitration agreements are
Where the courts have ruled an arbitration
unenforceable.'
contract invalid, the terms of the agreement have been deemed so
one-sided and unfair as to completely circumvent the arbitration
proceeding." For example, in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,"
the employer brought action to compel arbitration of employee's
The employee
sexual harassment claims under the FAA. 7
that
for
declaration
counterclaimed for violations of Title VII and
The
employer's arbitration agreements were unenforceable."
could
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that: (1) the employee
agree to arbitrate the Title VII claim in pre-dispute agreement;"
and (2) the employer materially breached agreement to arbitrate
The
by promulgating egregiously unfair arbitration rules."
repudiation of the arbitration agreement resulted because
"Hooters set up a dispute resolution process utterly lacking in the
rudiments of even-handedness, we hold that Hooters breached its
agreement to arbitrate."" In other instances, the court may find a
special relationship like the fiduciary one between the stock broker
and the investor where "reasonable expectations" of the investor
does not include a pre-dispute arbitration clause waiving the right
of access to the courts, the right to a jury trial and the right to
reasonable discovery, the right to findings of fact and the right to
enforce the rule of law applicable to her case by way of appeal. 2

51. Sternlight, supra note 9, at 647.

52. Id.
53. Levin, supra note 46, at 164; Thomas Stipanowich, Contract and
Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 831, 894 (2001).
54. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (1999)
(illustrating an example of when arbitration was held unenforceable).
55. Id. at 939.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 935.

Id. at 936.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 935.
Id.
62. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002); see Badie v.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998) (applying state contract law, the
California Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court's refusal to overturn
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Most courts reject the rationale in the Hooters case and
enforce the one-sided provisions of arbitration agreements." The
courts have based their decisions on contract theory and the
perceived Congressional preference for the FAA. 64 Generally, the
Supreme Court has held that the FAA passed by Congress in 1925
is to be interpreted to favor the use of arbitration.65 Arbitration
agreements are generally held to be "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."66 Because courts have construed the
FAA as proof of Congress' preference for arbitration, great
deference has been given to these agreements.6 7
B. Misunderstandingthe Ramifications of Submitting to
Arbitration
Though courts have adopted a pro-arbitration policy,
unsophisticated parties remain unaware of the ramifications of the
decision to submit to arbitration. 6 For example, arbitration
agreements, especially the agreements found in adhesion
contracts, often have the effect of depriving the unsophisticated
party of substantive and procedural due process rights. These lost
rights include the right to a trial, the right to an appeal, the right
to class action, the right to present evidence, and the right to
select an arbitrator.69 Consumers and prospective employees
assume they are guaranteed the same rights at arbitration as they
are in jury trials. In actuality, claimants often lose the ability to
seek punitive damages, the right to claim protections under
substantive law, and the option to exercise procedural rights that
are guaranteed at trial. 0 Most consumers and employees do not
trial court's decision not to enforce a bank's imposition of binding arbitration
clause as part of existing contracts with personal checking and credit card
customers).
63. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F. 3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Judge Easterbrook, "Competent adults are bound,... read or unread.").

64. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 937.
65. Id. at 936.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (declaring arbitration agreements
unenforceable); see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.

395, 411 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision to
elevate arbitration provisions above all other contractual provisions). See also
Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 895 (discussing the deference given to
arbitration). Stipanowich suggests an irony in the fact that "the kinds of cases

where courts are most likely to lend an ear to concerns about unfairness or
surprise

in

arbitration

agreements

were

business-to-business

sales

agreements under the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 895.
68. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 55.
69. Beth A. Rowe, Binding Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Opposing
Pre-DisputeAgreements, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 921, 923 (1996).
70. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion
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realize that they have waived these rights until they become
necessary. Some of the rights most often waived in preemployment or adhesion contracts are the aforementioned rightstrial, appeal, class action, and choice of the arbitrator."
1. Right to a Trial
The right to a trial by jury is considered a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution." The Seventh Amendment
provides that "(i)n suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved."73 The right to jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment is applicable to causes of action based on statutes.74
This application is central to employment claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 75 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act," Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),77
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 78 Equal Pay Act (EPA)," and
similar statues." But, the Supreme Court has ruled that an
employee can be required to submit a claim before an arbitrator if
the employee signed a pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration
agreement.8'
3. Right to Appeal
Most courts have ruled that arbitration decisions should not
be subject to appellate review for error of law.8" The courts have
left the role of delineating the grounds that constitute vacatur to
the legislative branch.83 Even in states that provide for judicial
review for error of law, the error must often arise from "fraud,

in Section 1 of the Federal ArbitrationAct: Correcting the Judiciary'sFailure
of Statutory Vision, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, n.217 (1991).

71. See Rowe, supra note 69, at 923 (detailing the rights waived in adhesion
contracts).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
73. Id.
74. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) (stating "the right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a
statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.");
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471-72 (1962).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000).
76. Id. § 1981(a).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
78. Id. § 2617.
79. Id. § 206.
80. Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in PreDispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of
Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1216 (2002).
81. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 US 105, 109-10 (2001).
82. See generally Levin, supra note 46, at 117-19.
83. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
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misconduct, [or] corruption ... ,84 In states where there is some
form of judicial review, there is often no duty to provide a written
opinion. Without this written explanation, review for errors of law

becomes extremely difficult.85
3.

No Right to Class Action

The use of a provision forbidding the filing of an action as
part of a class action effectively deters lawsuits 6 This occurs
because many individual claims are of such low value that it is
economically imprudent to proceed in a single suit.87 Often, the
arbitrator's salary, court costs and legal fees will surpass the
amount of the claim.8
In addition, when individual disputes
proceed to trial, the damages awarded are generally lower than
would occur in class action litigation." The lower damages are a
result of the use of arbitrators who are less likely to award
punitive damages than a jury." As a result of the lower awards,
an action which is illegal or against public policy is not effectively
deterred." Yet, effectively, the agreement to arbitrate precludes
bringing claims in a class.
4.

No Right To Select Arbitrator

Generally, litigants may not choose the judge who will decide
a traditional court case. However, arbitrating parties commonly
select the arbitrators that will decide disputes."
There are
numerous arbitration decision-making structures. 93 The numbers
of arbitrators who decide the dispute may vary. 4 The selection
method of the arbitrators is also subject to the preference of one or
more of the parties."5 The parties may choose from an institutional
list9" or may select arbitrators based on contract-based discretion.97
84. Levin, supra note 46, at 127.
85. Carpenter v. North River Ins. Co., 436 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. Ct. App.
1908). See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The
Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 1199 (2000).
86. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the ClassAction Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
87. Id. at 9.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).

92. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 708 (2001).

93. Id. at 708-09.
94. See Beattie v. Autostyle Plastics, 552 N.W.2d 181 (Mich. App. 1996).
95. Thomas

J.

Stipanowich,

The

Multi-Door Contract and

Possibilities,OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 303, 337 (1998).
96. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 61.
97. Stiponowich, supra note 95, at 330.

Other
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As compared with jury panels, which reflect the diversity of the
citizenry, lists of arbitrators are not diverse. Only six percent of
50,000 American Arbitration Association arbitrators are women."
Most are highly educated older, white males. This has been highly
criticized particularly in employment arbitration.99
No matter what the method, the party that retains the
greatest deal of control over the selection process may gain an
advantage. In commercialized arbitration agreements, this is
often an employer or corporate entity.0 0 Since an employer or
corporate entity often has repeat contact with the arbitrators (who
compete for the selector's repeated use), results more favorable to
the employer corporate entity are likely." 1
C. Standard of Waiver
To waive a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial and
the right to discovery,' the party must knowingly and voluntarily
assent to the arbitration."3 Knowingly and voluntarily assenting
to this waiver means that a party is entering a binding agreement
without fraud or duress.'
Parties can
agree to arbitrate claims
5°
under the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII."
Courts determine whether parties knowingly and voluntarily
assent to arbitration
agreements
and the employee's
understanding of the obligations under the agreement. 6 Although
the court in KMC v. Inrving Trust did not specifically define
"knowing and voluntary," its decision rested on the wording of the
arbitration agreement and the employee's understanding of his or

98. Smith v. American Arbitration Assoc., Inc., 233 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir.

2000) (affirming the dismissal of a suit alleging denial of plaintiffs equal
protection of law because of lack of gender diversity on list of arbitrators
available to arbitrate the claim); Katherine Eddy, To Every Remedy A Wrong:
The Confounding of Civil Liberties Through Mandatory ArbitrationClauses in
Employment Contracts, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 777 (2001).

99. Victoria J. Craine, The Mandatory Arbitration Clause: Forum Selection
or Employee Coercion?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 537, 550 (1999).

100. Id.
101. Drahozal, supra note 92, at 710. 33 D.H. Overmeyer Co. v Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (stating that waiver of due process rights must be

"voluntary, knowing and intelligently made"). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. "
Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding employees not bound by
arbitration agreements regarding sexual discrimination suits because they did

not knowingly forego their statutory rights and remedies).
102. Drahozal, supra note 92, at 697.

103. KMC v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that
most courts require that waivers of the right to a jury trial be "knowing and

voluntary.").
104. Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3rd Cir. 1988).
105. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).

106. KMC, 757 F.2d at 756.
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her obligations under the agreement. °7
In PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Lau, the court held that the
employee did not knowingly agree to arbitrate because the
securities exchange registration form that the employee was
required to sign as a condition of employment did not contain the
waivers to which the prospective employee was submitting. l ° In
general, consent is presumed granted in pre-employment" °9 and
consumer contracts.' °
D. Unconscionabilityof the Contract to Arbitrate
In judging the validity of arbitration clauses, the Supreme
Court has adopted a contractual approach. " ' This approach is
derived from the premise that arbitration clauses are contractual
agreements between two willing parties.1'
Thus, when
determining if a weaker party is bound by an arbitration
agreement in a consumer contract, the legal constructs for fraud,
duress or unconscionability in contract law apply.""
Courts have been generally unwilling to invalidate consumer
contracts on the grounds that they are adhesion contracts or that
there is extreme economic disparity between the two contracting
parties."' The doctrine of "adhesion" is an indicator within the
rubric of unconscionability."'
Courts have held that
unconscionability requires proof that the contract is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made." 6
Courts further note that there must be a showing of some absence
of meaningful choice by the parties and of contract terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party."7 The courts have
deemed
unfavorable
terms
to
constitute
"substantive"
unconscionability and lack of meaningful choice as procedural

107. Id. at 758.
108. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lau, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
109. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 54.
110. Brower v. Gateway, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
111. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1001 (1996).
112. Id. at 1004.
113. Seus v. John Nuveen & Co, 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating
that "[niothing short of a showing of fraud, duress, mistake or some other
ground recognized by the law of contracts generally would have excused the
district court from enforcing Seus's [mandatory arbitration] agreement.").

Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating that "generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements. . .
114. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
115. Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 21 J. CORP.
L. 331, 348 (1996).
116. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573.

117. Id.
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unconscionability. 118
When determining if there are reasonable alternatives to a
consumer agreement, the courts have looked at whether there
were competitors or employers that offered consumer contracts
with more favorable terms."a9 The court noted that "with the
ability to make the purchase elsewhere and the express option to
return the goods, the consumer is not in a 'take it or leave it'
position at all; if any term of the agreement is unacceptable to the
consumer, he or she can easily buy a competitor's product
instead . . ."120
This same rationale has been extended to employment
contracts where courts have noted the choice not to begin work
where the terms of employment are unacceptable. 2' Arbitration
clauses that are hidden in a lengthy document, written in fine
print, drafted using complex legal jargon, or negotiated between
parties of unequal bargaining power may indicate a procedurally
unconscionable agreement. 122 In commercialized contracts, the
parties are almost always in unequal bargaining positions. Thus,
unless the arbitration contract leaves the weaker party effectively
without a remedy, the courts will not invalidate an arbitration
clause simply because of unequal bargaining power." 3
For example, the court in Hooters found that the arbitration
agreement between the employer and employee included
provisions 1) requiring the employee to provide notice of the
nature of her claim while the company did not have to file any
responsive pleadings; 2) requiring the employee to list all fact
witnesses and a brief summary of facts known while the company
did not have to do the same; and 3) requiring the employee and
employer to select arbitrators exclusively from a list of arbitrators
created by the employer." The arbitrators could have even been
managers or corporate officers. 5 The court stated in dicta that
"[b]y creating a sham system unworthy even of the name of
arbitration, Hooters completely failed in performing its contractual
118. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed. 1999).
119. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
120. Id.

121. Id.
122. FARNSWORTH, supra note 118, § 4.28.
123. Preston v. Kruezer, 641 F.Supp. 1163, 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that
the claimant would have to be without a remedy in order for the agreement to
be deemed invalid). See also Hooters, 173 F.3d at 941(holding that, as a
general rule, objections to the fairness of the arbitration should be brought

before the arbitrator, but that, when the weaker party is denied the
opportunity for arbitration, the issue is justifiable); Reuben, supra note 2, at 6
(arguing that the absence of legal standards and substantive judicial review of
arbitration awards leads to "gross substantive and procedural injustices"
where power imbalance between parties).
124. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938-39.
125. Id. at 939.
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, 1, 26

Because of the difficulty in establishing unconscionability,
little protection is afforded the unsophisticated consumer. 127 The
stronger party may effectively emasculate the substantive and
procedural legal protections afforded to consumers or employees
through the use of an arbitration agreement; thus, the risks of the
bargain are shifted to the weaker party.
E.

Courts Espouse The "Myth" of Voluntariness

Pre-employment and consumer arbitration agreements are
given validity because the U.S. Supreme Court articulates and
gives credence to the "myth" of voluntariness in these situations.
The Court's assertion that arbitration is preferential on policy and
legal grounds is manifested in many recent rulings. 2 8
This
preference is most clearly manifested in the under-girding of
consumer arbitration agreements through the use of contract
law. 9 Also, as noted by Professor Jean Sternlight, there are three
myths that are propagated by the courts. 30 First, the courts
espouse that there is a legislative preference for arbitration;
second, the courts promote that Congress intended the FAA to
apply to federal and state courts; and finally, the courts advance
that the substantive results obtained from arbitration are similar
to results obtained through litigation.'
Each of these myths will
be addressed in turn.
1.

Congress PrefersArbitration

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, courts did
not usually enforce arbitration agreements that were entered
before a dispute arose.' 32 However, awards from arbitration
126. Id. at 940.

The Hooters court acknowledged that, even though the

contract in question was unenforceable, their decision should not "be
misunderstood as permitting a full-scale assault on the fairness of proceedings
before the matter is submitted to arbitration." Id. at 941.
127. See Preston, 641 F.Supp. at 1171 (stating that "the mere fact that one
party to a contract enjoyed little relative bargaining strength however cannot
alone render a contractual provision unenforceable."). See also Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 41 (holding that there will often be unequal bargaining power between
employees and employers, but that alone is not sufficient to hold an
arbitration award unenforeceable).
128. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24, 25 (indicating the court's liberal federal
policy toward arbitration agreements). See also Circuit City Stores v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (describing why the courts favor arbitration).
129. Sternlight, supra note 9, at 641.

130. Id. at 642.
131. Id. at 641-42. See Reuben supra note 2, at n.35 (citing Carrington &

Haagen, infra note 132, at 334, and stating the a proposed reason for the
Supreme Court's recent support of contractual arbitration is due to its
"renewed" embrace of contract rights).
132. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
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agreements that were entered post-dispute were generally just as
enforceable as court judgments.'33 This distinction was made to
ensure mutual assent." ' The courts were hesitant to infer mutual
assent because less sophisticated parties were not as likely to
contemplate all the ramifications of pre-dispute resolution.1 35 As
one state court noted, "by first making the contract and then
declaring who should construe it, the strong could oppress the
weak, and in effect so nullifying the law as to secure the
enforcement of contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or contrary to
public policy." 136 Generally, courts of equity refused to order
specific performance of an arbitration agreement or to deny7
litigation of disputes covered by an arbitration agreement."1
Damages were available for breach of agreement
to arbitrate, but
8
they were difficult to prove or were nominal. 1
The Supreme Court began its doctrinal shift towards
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment
contracts in 1974, with the decision in Alexander v. GardnerDenver."9 In Alexander, the Court decided that a union member
could pursue a racial discrimination claim in court after receiving
an adverse ruling under an arbitration agreement.'
The Court
ruled that an employee could not prospectively waive rights
granted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, nor could

SUP. CT. REv. 331, 334-36 (1996).
133. See Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242, 255
(1890) (holding that a stipulation between parties that provides only for a
method of determining the amount of an award, and that leaves liability
determinations to the court, is valid); see also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 (1924) (holding that effect will be given to an
arbitration award by a court of law); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding that the Court would
not narrowly construe arbitration agreements and would thus give latitude to
the contracting parties).
134. See Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) (reasoning that
mutual assent was important by holding that "the underlying reason for the
recognition of the [arbitration] award is found in the fact that the parties not
only agreed to submit their differences, but voluntarily permitted the
agreement to be executed, and consented for the award to be actually made by
judges of their own selection.").
135. See id. (noting that "the more astute party [could] oust the courts of
jurisdiction.").
136. Id.
137. Kulukundis Shipping, 126 F.2d. at 984.
138. Id.
139. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
140. See id. at 45 (holding that federal courts have plenary power to enforce
compliance with Title VII, and that a prior decision by an arbitrator does not
"[foreclose] an individual's right to sue or [divest] federal courts of
jurisdiction."). See also Reilly, supra note 80, at 1213 (stating that courts have
allowed employees to bring claims before a court, even when they have been
subject to mandatory arbitration).
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41
arbitration bar an individual from seeking a judicial remedy.
Scholars noted a significant increase in the number of civil cases
as a result of Alexander.14
The increased caseload was one impetus behind the doctrinal
change. 4 ' The change was enunciated in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.14 and later in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v.Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.14' The doctrine, as
noted in Mitsubishi, is that a party that agrees to arbitrate a claim
does not give up substantive statutory rights, but instead allows
its resolution to occur in an alternative forum. 146 This decision was
the initial step towards recharacterizing arbitration agreements as
contractual in nature and thus requiring enforcement unless
fraud, duress, or unconscionability was proven.
Next, Gilmer v.Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.147 was decided.
The Supreme Court ruled that a pre-employment registration with
a national stock exchange, which required submission to
arbitration of any claim that rose from employment, was
enforceable. 4 ' Courts have subsequently used these decisions to
vigorously uphold pre-employment arbitration agreements. But
this shift is inconsistent with the congressional intentions under
the FAA. As noted by scholars, section 2 of the agreement "makes
enforceable arbitration agreements covering disputes 'arising out

of a contract between the two parties."1 49 The statute does not

purport to enforce agreements to arbitrate "any and all
controversies between parties to an arbitration agreement. . ..",1
The legislative history indicates that there was concern that
the law would be misapplied to the detriment to unsophisticated
individuals. Senator Walsh of Montana spoke of the FAA's use to
enforce adhesion contracts:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts
that are entered into are really not voluntar[y] things at all. Take
an insurance policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you
can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either you
can make that contract or you cannot make any contract. It is the
same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says,
'These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.' Well there is
141. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974).
142. Reilly, supra note 80, at 1214.
143. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
638 (1985). The Court noted that the FAA favored arbitration agreements and
thus a presumption toward arbitration was established. Id. at 626.
144. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
145. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614
146. Id. at 628.
147. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
148. Id. at 23.
149. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 75.
150. Id. at 75-76.
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nothing for the man to do except to sign it and then he surrenders
his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried
before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.'"
The Senator was assured by fellow Congressmen that the bill
was not intended to cover situations like the ones raised in his
hypothetical. 5 ' However Senator Walsh's concern has come to
pass under the current Supreme Court.
2. FAA Applies To State And Federal Courts.
In numerous decisions, the Court has preempted state
authority to govern arbitration agreements through its
interpretation of the FAA.'
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., the Court ruled that if a party to a contract
moves to invalidate the entire contract due to fraud, the arbitrator
retains control.14 However, if a party moves to invalidate the
arbitration clause because of fraud, then the court will retain
jurisdiction.15' Under an opposite ruling, the moving party could
have litigated in court the arbitration agreement as a whole."'
7
This would leave only a few issues for the arbitrator to decide."0
Under Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., the Supreme Court held that a district court
could not predicate its stay of an arbitration agreement based on
an identical action brought in state court."8 The Court further
held that the purpose of the FAA was to create substantive federal
law that controls both in federal and state courts."9 In dicta the
Court stated, "as a matter of federal law, any doubts ...should be

resolved in favor of arbitration ....
""o
Even more importantly, the Supreme Court in Southland
Corp. v. Keating' held that the FAA preempted state statutes
that specifically overruled arbitration agreements. 62 The state
Franchise Investment Law was held by the California Supreme
Court to render void arbitration agreements that arose from its

151. Id. at 76.
152. Id.

153. See e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967) (determining the circumstances that warrant a federal court's
jurisdiction over the dispute).
154. Id. at 404.
155. Id. at 403-04.
156. Brafford, supra note 115, at 337.
157. Id.
158. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28
(1983).
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 24-25.
161. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
162. Id. at 16.
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implementation.'63 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
citing the congressional policy under the FAA preferring
arbitration to litigation and the Supremacy Clause. 6 4
State
defenses to contract law were not effected. Further, in Mitsubishi
Motors, 6' the Court upheld the enforcement of arbitration clauses
even when
the arbitrator would be forced to interpret a federal
66
statute. 1
These decisions run counter to the initial congressional
intent. The limited manner in which unconscionability laws are
applied effectively removes the possible application of law to
arbitrated disputes. In addition, the Supreme Court's use of the
FAA to preempt state legislation runs counter to the commitment

to the federalist system. 167

3. ArbitrationResults Substantially The Same As Litigation
The final myth is that similar disputes that are resolved
through arbitration result in the same outcome as if litigated. The
primary advantages that courts want to achieve with arbitration
are expediency, financial savings, and less taxation on the judicial
system. 66
However, the limited empirical evidence seems to
indicate that arbitration skews results in favor of employers or the
party in the stronger negotiating position. 6 9
One study compared employment cases decided by California7
juries to arbitrated employee disputes in the securities industry.' 1
The study found that employees won in fifty-seven percent of the
jury cases and in fifty-three percent of the arbitrated cases. 7' This
difference is not statistically significant, but an important
difference surfaced when the claims of discrimination were
compared. In jury verdicts, employees were successful forty-four
percent of the time while plaintiffs were successful twenty-six
percent of the time in arbitration. Perhaps the most important
finding was that the median jury award was $264,700 while the
median arbitrated award was just $49,900. 172 This study provides

163. Id. at 5.
164. Id. at 16.
165. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614.
166. See generally id. (holding the arbitration agreement enforceable).
167. Sternlight, supra note 9, at 697.
168. Brafford, supra note 115, at 333.
169. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 64.
170. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Summary of California Jury Verdicts
Study 1-4 (1995). The study compiled data from 949 verdicts that were
reported. Id.

171. Id.
172. See Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look
at Compulsory Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims After Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 21, 35-37 (1995)
(noting a survey of sixty-two awards in security industry employment cases
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evidence that there is a disparate impact on individuals that
submit to arbitration.
F. ProposalsFor Reform Abound
Calls for reform have come from varied groups. The ABA,
unions, and even state legislators have taken another look at
reforming arbitration.' The reform ideas range from barring predispute arbitration clauses in consumer and statutory civil rights
situations like employment to implementing a step-process where
disputes are first mediated and then, if necessary, arbitrated.
Some of these reform ideas are addressed below.
1. Presumptively Unenforceable
Protections may be afforded to the weaker party by assuming
agreements are presumptively
that certain arbitration
The arbitration agreements that should be
unenforceable.
targeted are agreements that are entered pre-dispute and are
adhesive in nature. There is a greater likelihood that both parties
have carefully weighed the eminent outcomes of their dispute once
the dispute has arisen. As noted by Todd Rakhoff, there are
numerous principles that support the presumption against
Among them is the need to maintain the social
enforcement.'
independence of the parties, the danger in upholding
arrangements that hinder competition, the possibility that
stronger parties must not be allowed to circumvent the law
through contract and waiver, and the risks that can be evidenced
by the document but not totally shifted. Adhesive contracts lie on
the periphery of general contract doctrine and thus may merit this
special analysis.
2. The Mini-Trial.
An alternative to the current system of inequitable
arbitration under a pre-employment contract is a system requiring
reasoned awards, application of the rule of law, and the possibility
for judicial review. The use of reasoned opinions imposes
An arbitrator
transparency on the dispute resolution process.
at the
rationally
more
that is forced to justify a decision may look
76
Association
Arbritration
American
elements of the dispute. The
that came before the NASD and NYSE).
173. SABO & ZAHN, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION,
available at http://www.sabozahn.com/pdf/37.pdf (last visited May 4, 2003).
174. Todd D. Rakhoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1174, 1176 (1983).
175. Alan Scott Rau, Symposium: The Lawyer's Duties and Responsibilities
in Dispute Resolution: Article: Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV
485, 530 (1997).
176. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 652 (1995).
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("AAA") has adopted this position and the AAA rules now permit
either party to ask for an "opinion" from the arbitrator, as long as
the request is made before arbitration commences.
Though arbitration relieves congestion in the courts and is
less expensive than litigation, the rulings that come from
arbitration decisions must be predictable.
The common law
system in the United States assures that precedents will be
followed. Individuals can then modify their behavior to fit what is
normatively acceptable under the law. Consistency is necessary
for conformity of behavior. This same principle is necessary for
arbitration awards. To accomplish this, arbitration decisions
should serve as precedent for subsequent arbitrated disputes. If
arbitration decisions are based on the law, then this will be less
difficult to accomplish. An example of this is seen in the proposed
177
amendment to the Illinois version of Uniform Arbitration Act.
The Chicago Bar Association (CBA) Civil Practice Committee in
2001 recommended the conformity to law for arbitrated disputes;
however, that recommendation was never adopted by its Board of
Managers.
3.

The Step Process

A number of courts have instituted a step-process of dispute
resolution. 178
This system involves the referral of a dispute
initially to mediation. If mediation is not successful, then the
parties enter arbitration, and ultimately the issue may be
adjudicated. 7 9 There may be intervening, optional steps including
an early neutral evaluation and a summary jury trial.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama is paradigmatic of the step-process. 8 ' Parties to the
dispute who opt for the program first enter into mediation. If
mediation proves unsuccessful, then the parties move to
arbitration. At this step, they may introduce evidence and
advance their complaints. There is then a decision based on the
merits of the case. If, however, a party is dissatisfied with the
result, they may proceed to trial. 8'
177. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 et. seq. Illinois law does not require
arbitrators to follow the rule of law.
178. This process has been instituted in courts in California, New Jersey,

Texas, Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and Alabama. This concept
was originally coined the "multi-door courthouse" by Frank E. A. Sander,

Varieties of Dispute Processing, The Pound Conference, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111
(1976).
179. Stipanowich, supra note 95, at 321-22.

180. Id. at 322.
181. Id. If the parties elect to continue to trial, the court will hear the case
de novo. Id. at 322. However, if the party that rejects the arbitration fails to
receive a better judgment in court, that party pays all the opponents fees and
attorneys costs associated with the trial. Id.
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The advantage to this step process is that it is premised on a
flexible tailoring of the process to the controversy aimed at better
resolutions of existing disputes, as well as grievances that were
182
not then being aired for a lack of an appropriate mechanism.
The system preserves expediency, judicious use of resources, and
relieves crowded court dockets, yet ensures due process and equal
protection for both parties.
III. PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS ARE OFTEN MADE PART OF A CONTRACT WITHOUT
CONSENT OF THE PARTIES

Provisions for pre-dispute arbitration in commercial
183
agreements may also lack the requisite consent to be enforceable
because transactional attorneys who advise these contracting
parties often misunderstand basic aspects of binding arbitration
Thomas J. Stipanowich
as a dispute resolution process.
recognizes the role of transactional lawyers as "contract planners"
who can manage future problems by negotiation and drafting.'88
To do this successfully, "planners need a basic appreciation of their
and
availability
the
limitations,
and
uses
practical
appropriateness of legal 'teeth,' if any, and the roles played by
third-party interveners."'8 7 Without such clear understanding of
arbitration law and the process, the consent to arbitrate is
questionable.
The nature of transactional work is to focus on the
"win/win."'88 In negotiating the contracts that will structure their
relationships, business clients are urged to collaborate with the
other side. 88 Transactional lawyers in business and real estate
support their clients in deal making, not disputes. In fact, because
182. Id. at 304. See generally Court Says No Passing on Step ADR Clauses,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TIMES, July-Sept. 2002 (discussing an Eleventh Circuit

case where a party missed a step and thus did not adequately set the
arbitration process in motion).
183. Levin, supra note 46, at 180 (arguing that "Uludicial scrutiny ought to
focus on the voluntariness of the agreement, and not the correctness of the
arbitration award.").

184. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 4-5 (defining arbitration as an "informal
process in which substantive and procedural law are not necessarily applied
and in which arbitration decisions are final in that they are not subject to
substantive review by courts beyond procedural defects such as arbitral
bias.").
185. See Levin, supra note 46, at 174-75 (identifying the "problem" with
respect to voluntariness as one where the role of substantive law in arbitration
is not clearly defined, participants misunderstand the role and, "in this
environment of confusion and misunderstanding[,]" some agree to arbitrate).
186. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 831-32.
187. Id. at 917.
188. Brunet, supra note 5, at 124.
189. Id.

The John Marshall L.azw Review

[36:589

of what may seem like "unnecessary squabbling to the contracting
process," 9 ' such attorneys may want to avoid objecting to use of
arbitration in future disputes. Their clients do not want to focus
on possible failure of the business relationship, i.e, the "divorce" at
the beginning of the relationship.'
Furthermore, in his recent article studying "high stakes
employment contracts," which makes use of empirical research
based on completed S&P 500 CEO contracts,'92 Edward Brunet
questions the "popular mythology that arbitration and mediation
will be optimal for each party."'93 Brunet suggested that where
parties want low risk, predictable results, they may be better off
with litigation or "judicialized arbitration" that requires the
arbiter to apply the rule of law to future disputes.'
This article
provides some apt comparisons between the negotiating of a
dispute resolution clause of a contract between highly skilled
employees and prospective employers and the negotiating of a
dispute resolution clause in other contracts where parties are
relatively equal in bargaining power. 9 ' Such parties often have
spent "huge amounts to obtain and comply with the legal opinions
of counsel."" 6 Business clients who invest in legal advice adopt a
legal position that is "'close to the line' the optimal business
posture for the firm consistent with 'the law."' 7 In a real sense,
then, arbitration awards and awards based on "equity" rather
than the "law" yield a negative return. "An arbitration award that
is premised upon the arbitrator's gut level of 'fairness,' rather than
the substantive rule of law, yields a negative return on investment
for a business that has paid attorneys for legal advice."" 8
A. Misunderstandingsof TransactionalLawyers: Rule Of Law;
Reasoned Awards; And JudicialReview
I have identified three areas of misunderstanding on the part
of transactional attorneys that support the conclusion that their
advice regarding binding arbitration clauses contributes to a lack
of the "knowing consent" on which enforceability of such clauses is
based. All three involve the incorrect expectation that arbitration,
with its third-party decision maker, is sort of a private court, with

190. Id. at 116.
191. See id. at 113-28 (describing this reality with respect to negotiating
employment contracts for high stakes workers by analyzing seven
hypotheticals).
192. Brunet, supra note 5, at 109.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

108.
135.
117.
112.
113.
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a private judge who may know more about the facts of the
controversy than a real jurist, but who will apply applicable law,
explain the decision and be subject to review.
1.

Substantive Law Applies

First, transactional lawyers expect that the arbitrator shall
apply a "rule of law"'99 in resolving the dispute. 20 The Hammond
Survey of transactional lawyers representing business clients in
commercial transactions indicates that most lawyers expected that
the arbitrator was required to apply a rule of law to the dispute. 0 '
In fact, of course, unless the contract provides otherwise, the
"folklore arbitration "2°2 standard is "principles of fairness and
equity."20 ' The Latin phrase, ex aequo et bono, provides little
guidance. Justice Black remarked that arbitrators may be "wholly
unqualified to decide legal issues" 0 ' but that does not matter since
the arbitrator has no duty to resolve a dispute in accord with the
parties' legal rights..20 Results are the product of "fact-dominated
rough justice."0 6 Unless the arbitrator perpetrates fraud, is
biased, or exhibits other serious misconduct, as narrowly
defined,0 7 there is no basis for overturning an award because it
fails to follow the substantive law.
Murray S. Levin expressed surprise at the

199. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989) (noting that, in this context "rule of law" means parties
should be treated the same, that the law should be fair, that law should be
predictable, stable and transparent and judges should be neutral and
independent.). See also Reuben, supra note 2, at 15-17 (stating that the value
of a rule of law as important to the collective rights of society, separately from
protections afforded to an individual). The author recognizes a "fundamental
jurisprudential tension" in deciding whether to enforce agreements to
arbitrate between the rule of law and personal autonomy that is part of
freedom of Contract. Id.
200. Levin, supra note 46, at 107, 179 (acknowledging acknowledges that
role of substantive law in arbitration may be confusing to many lawyers).
201. See Celeste Hammond, Survey for Business / Commercial Lawyers
Regarding Binding Arbitration, (Jan. 2002) (unpublished survey on file with
author) (noting that over seventy percent of those surveyed had this
expectation).
202. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model
of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) (coining this term to indicate the
arbitration process unaltered by contract).
203. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 712 (1999) (stating that "[aln
agreement to arbitrate is in effect, an agreement to comply with the
arbitrator's decision, whether or not the arbitrator applies law ....).
204. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
205. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 345.
206. Brunet, supra note 5, at 110.
207. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
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little judicial attention directed to the precise issue of the proper
role for substantive law in the arbitral decision-making process. For
the most part the courts have merely skirted the issue while
addressing attempts to vacate arbitration awards because of alleged
errors of or lack of regard for the law."'8
Brunet suggests that if one party or her attorney lacks
information that "the arbitrators can ignore legal rights and
decide disputes based upon pure gut instincts,"2 9° that lack of
knowledge itself may contribute to the possibility of opportunistic
behavior in the negotiation. The misinformed commercial party
will expect arbitration to protect legal rights just as the typical
consumer and employee reasonably may expect justice in
accordance with applicable law. 10
A party to a commercial
agreement may expect such protection if the attorney advising him
has such an expectation. 1
2.

Reasoned Awards

Secondly, transactional lawyers expect that the arbitrator will
provide reasons for the award.2 1 However, the general American
practice, without amendment of the arbitration clause, does not
require arbitrators to explain their decisions.2 3 Alan Scott Rau
explores the effect of the absence of any requirement of a reasoned
opinion on arbitral decision-making and notes a link between
giving of reasons and a commitment to some rule.2 4 He points out
that the practice in other legal systems is the opposite. 10 And, the
International Chamber of Commerce Rules require a statement of
reasons and a review of the award before it becomes final.216

208. Levin, supra note 46, at 124.
209. Brunet, supra note 5, at 116.
210. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 904.
211. See Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of
AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 156 (1994) (noting
that, in reacting to a survey of Minnesota construction arbitrators functioning
according the AAA rules, Dean Thompson was surprised at the "fact that a
significant number of arbitrators do not follow the law," in that the AIA
General Conditions require that "the contract shall be governed by the law of
the place where the project is located.").
212. See Hammond Survey, supra note 201, at question #50 (noting that
between thirty-five and forty percent of the respondents indicated that they
expected a reasoned award "always;" an additional thirty-two expected this
would happen "usually.").
213. See Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 535 (reporting a survey of
construction industry bar, not as to what they "expect" but as to their
"preference" and found that for cases involving over $250,000, fifty-five
percent favored requirement of written findings of fact and forty percent
favored requirement of written conclusions of law).
214. Rau, supra note 175, at 535.
215. Id. at 538.
216. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 347-48.
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Recently revised AAA Rules allow either party to request reasons
as long as the request is made at the beginning of the hearing.2"7
Other specialized arbitration systems that require reasons include
the diamond industry,2 1 collective bargaining, and a wide range of
trade associations."' 8 The Center of Public Resources (CPR) NonAdministered Arbitration Rules provide for reasoned awards
unless the parties provide otherwise.2
3. JudicialReview
The third misconception transactional lawyers have about
binding arbitration is that the award is reviewable for errors of
law.22' Generally, arbitral decisions are not reviewable for errors of
fact or of law. 2
Moreover, there is interaction between these three
misunderstood areas of arbitration. Thus, without reasoned
awards by the arbitrator and with no recourse to judicial review,2 2
the meaning of a rule of law standard is unclear. 24 It is,
practically speaking, impossible to determine that the arbitrator
did not apply the substantive law without expressed reasons for
the decision. 22 ' As Stephen Hayford points out, even if the rule of
law is not the standard for arbitrator's award, the absence of
reasoned awards means that parties and their counsel "are
provided no reliable indicia of whether the arbitrator's decision

217. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE REVIEW BOARD GUIDE
at
available
2000),
(Dec.
1,
104(k)
§
SPECIFICATIONS
http://www.alta.org/store/rules/index.htm.
218. Rau, supra note 175, at n.175.
219. Id. at 536.
220. Id. at n.162.
221. Hammond Survey, supra note 201, at questions #51, #54, and #57.
Over fifty percent of the transactional lawyers without experience with
arbitration expected that some form of judicial review existed for parties
unhappy with the result. Id. See Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 468 (stating
that transactional lawyers are the only misinformed parties and reporting
that some of the respondents to a 1985 survey of construction lawyers
conducted by the ABA showed "ignorance or confusion regarding current
standards of review.").
222. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 880. See Cole, supra note 85, at 1238
(citing Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854), for the U.S. Supreme
Court's clear position that awards would not be set aside for errors of law or of
fact). See also Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 439 (noting that the "arbitral
award is generally assailable only on very limited grounds such as fraud or
denial of a hearing.").
223. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 347 (discussing whether a
particular decision or award is faithful to controlling law in FAA arbitration).
224. Cole, supra note 85, at n.267. Cole agrees that even where enhanced
judicial review is part of the agreement, review for "errors of law" is not
workable unless the arbitrator would write an opinion explaining findings of
fact and law. Id.
225. Ware, supra note 203, at 721.
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was founded on a full understanding of the material facts and a
proper interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of
their contract and the applicable law."226 All they have is the
award without any means for analyzing whether it is "fair," other
than the arbitrator's view of the dispute.
B. Confusion of TransactionalLawyers
My interaction with practitioners raised the suspicion that
transactional lawyers do not understand important aspects of the
arbitral process and are ill-equipped to counsel clients about the
inclusion and the details of arbitration clauses. On several
occasions the author had been asked to speak on aspects of
arbitration-particularly on the absence of reasoned awards, the
absence of a requirement that arbitrators follow a rule of law, and
the absence of judicial review for failure to follow the law at bar
association conferences. These presentations were included in the
broader category of "Traps for the Unwary" because of the
recognition that the audience, mostly transactional, commercial
real estate lawyers, were not well versed in Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR). Perhaps the audience's expectation that
arbitration clauses were revocable was consistent with the earlier
view of arbitration that permitted a party who had agreed to
arbitrate future disputes to change his mind and withdraw
assent.227
Like Thomas Stipanowich, the author discussed
commercial arbitration with many sophisticated practitioners and
trial court judges and discovered many who confused mediation
and arbitration or believed that the arbitrator was bound by
applicable substantive law.228 Moreover, the Hammond Survey
discloses a confusion of mediation and arbitration in the minds of
some survey respondents. For example, the expectation that the
''parties must agree with the terms of any award which the
arbitrator enters before it becomes binding"29 by some is more
consistent with the mediation process than with arbitration.23 °
C. Legal Education's Focus on Litigationas the Dispute
Resolution Method as Well as the Source of Much Law
Traditional legal education focuses on dispute resolution
through the litigation system, rather than on transactions and
226. Hayford, supra note 38, at 446.

227. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 340.
228. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at n.17.
229. See Hammond Survey, supra note 201, at question #49(c) (analyzing the
responses, which show that eight percent of transactional lawyers believed

that "the parties must agree with the terms of any award which the arbitrator
enters before it becomes binding.").
230. The author tested her hypotheses with empirical research in the
Hammond Survey.
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planning, which leads lawyers to expect that the rule of law is the
basis for our system of justice."' The ascendancy of the "rule of
law" versus "rule of men" is based as much on the need for
predictability and its function to mold behavior as the belief that
justice is better served.23 To the extent that "folklore arbitration"
does not require application of substantive rules of law, has no
judicial review, and is secretive, it does not support this
tradition.23 Heinrich Kronstein, perhaps cynically, examines the
power of an association like the AAA or the International
Chamber of Commerce, both of which he would term "institutional
arbitration," to appoint the arbitrators, to appoint the place of the
hearing and to determine other aspects of the arbitration. 2 4 He
criticizes this development, "[i]n the name of freedom of contract
courts have given arbitrators the power to determine the legality
of a contract, and in addition have conferred on them the power to
develop and systematize new 'rules,' outside of and uncontrolled by
courts, yet applicable in entire fields of business."235 He complains
that "they consider as 'law's' principle task the bestowal of a legal
blessing upon the fullest utilization of a freedom-of-contract
concept as formal and as empty of substance as such freedom can
be."2 6
231. See Rau, supra note 175, at 533 (commenting about the difficulty of
rationalizing a result that might occur in an arbitration of a breach of an
installment sales contract or a claim based on fraud with the expected result
under the contracts doctrine).
232. Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and The Rule of Law, THE RULE OF LAW
121-22 (Ian Shapiro, ed., NYU Press 1994). Lawrence B. Solum traces the
ideal of the rule of law at least as far back as Aristotle and indicates that it
has seven requirements, including "no extralegal commands are obligatory[;]
[tihe personal will or arbitrary decision of government officials should not
serve as the basis for imposing legal detriments; the legal system should meet
the requirement of publicity ....

[Diecisions should reflect the precept that

similar cases should be treated similarly." Id. at 122.
233. See Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 914 (commenting on the impact of no
judicial review of arbitration awards). Stipanowich states:
Practically speaking, of course, policies of judicial deference to
arbitration awards, the absence of a record, and of an opinion
accompanying the award have amounted to a virtual 'don't ask, don't
tell' policy regarding judicial treatment of arbitral awards, leaving
parties to draw their own conclusions about how the result jibes with
legal standards, business practices, or other norms that might have
been applied more overtly in a court of law.
Id. See also Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitrationis Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661,
662 (1963) (predicting that arbitration will lead to "removal of duly constituted
legislative and judicial control over large areas of conduct, and the upsetting of
traditional concepts about the sources to which the individual may look to the
ordering of his behavior in society and the normal expectations he can have
regarding the applications of that ordering to himself.").
234. Kronstein, supra note 233, at 662.
235. Id. at 667.
236. Id. See Carrington & Haggen, supra note 132, at 334 (providing a more
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Law schools, of course, repeatedly use casebooks filled with
appellate opinions as their primary teaching material. This leads
many attorneys to expect that judicial review is available for
errors of law and serious errors of fact in the United States dispute
resolution system. Most of these attorneys are, however, most
familiar with litigation as a dispute resolution system.
Moreover, "fairness" and "equity" are not presented as
separate from legal rules in law school. Students, and the lawyers
they become, imagine that equity provides principles to guide
around strict rules of law whose application may lead to
unfairness in particular instances.238 Lawrence B. Solum argues
for a "virtue centered" dispute resolution system where equity is
"not the exercise of arbitrary discretion.", 39 He notes real tensions
between the values that underlie the rule of law and the practice
of equity, which sometimes involves judges going beyond the letter
of the law and which leads to less predictable results.24 ° However,
Solum is thinking about a system of justice that is based on the
rule of law, which may not be an accurate way to describe binding
arbitration. To the extent that both arbitration and mediation
yield private results, they endanger law making by stare decisis.
United States District Judge Sarah S. Vance of the Eastern
District of Louisiana fears that the reduced role for courts in
developing rules of law actually makes going to trial more risky, a
"game of chance" because litigants have less information about the
likely outcome. 4 '
Stephan Landsman of DePaul University College of Law and
co-chair of the ABA Litigation Section's Civil Justice Institute
fears that the reduction in the number of trials actually endangers
According to Professor
the litigation system's legitimacy. 42
Landsman, "If you try too few cases, if they become a rarity you

recent comment agreeing that the U.S. Supreme Court's emphasis on contract
rights explains the Court's support of contractual arbitration).
237. See Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 835 (noting as a supporter of the
trend away from litigation and towards arbitration, he criticizes contracts
courses which are taught "as if the appellate judicial decision is the normal
method of resolving contracts disputes, despite the fact that the vast majority
of issues and disputes never result in a complaint, and the vast majority of
filed cases are dismissed or settled without trial.").
238. See Solum, supra note 232, at 27 (discussing H.L.A. Hart's view that
"judges are constrained by the law in the decision of easy cases, within the
core of a rule. In the penumbra, decisions are governed by the discretion of

Doing equity in the penumbra of the rules is simply the
the judge ....
exercise of discretion .... .") (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121150 (Oxford University Press 1961)).
239. Solum, supra note 232, at 136.

240. Id. at 135.
241. Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 26.

242. Id.
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lose that sense of legitimization."4 3 Even negotiations occur "in
the shadow of law." " Parties to negotiations, mediation or nonbinding arbitration are aware that "they have the option to go to
court, if an agreement is not reached."" 5 Jean Sternlight explains
that the lines between litigation with its application of the rule of
law to particular facts and ADR are blurred; the processes are not
merely complementary, but intertwined. 46
Furthermore, to the extent that what is "fair" is determined
by expectations, the rule of law and consistent adherence to it are
24 7
important to the development of what we consider to be "fair."
While some commentators advocate privatizing the justice system
with the expectation that systems would develop to enforce awards
and to guarantee consistency of results without judicial
precedents,4 8 others point to the international arbitration
experience as evidence of a "ton of uncertainty" which tends to
lead to litigation. 49
Finally, the focus of legal education on appellate cases leads
students to expect that judicial review is available for errors of law
and serious errors of fact in dispute resolution, including
arbitration. Then Attorney General Janet Reno addressed the
Association of American Law Schools at its annual meeting in
January 1999 and urged law schools to educate future lawyers in
more than just dispute resolution. She emphasized the role of
"lawyer as advisor," "lawyer as planner" and "lawyer as problem
solver" to require students to see themselves as responding to
clients' needs and interests before disputes arise. 50 In effect,
243. Id.
244. Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An
Argument That the Term "ADR" has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J.
DiSP. RESOL. 97, 108 (2000) (citing Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
997 (1979)).
245. Sternlight, supra note 244, at 108.
246. Id. at 107.
247. See Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Across the Ripple of Time: The Future of
Alternative (or, is it "Appropriate?")Dispute Resolution, 36 TULSA L.J. 785, 794
(2001) (arguing that, in a market system, including the new ones in former
Communist countries, an adversarial system "grounded upon a rights-based
paradigm, in turn founded upon 'the rule of law,' must remain in place .....
Otherwise, he fears "anarchistic manipulations of situational morality 'whatever works'- and can be agreed upon, notwithstanding extant legal
principles" which if left unchecked "erodes essential societal and economic
stability ....

" Id.

248. BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 371-72 (Pacific Research
Institute for Public Policy 1990).
249. Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial
Arbitration and the Civil Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 578, 589
(2000).
250. Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to AALS, 49
J. LEGAL EDUC.5, 8 (1999).
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Attorney General Reno was recognizing the deficiencies in legal
education for the bulk of transactional lawyers.251
D. The Role of Legal Scholarship
In scholarly writings, there frequently is confusion of binding
arbitration with non-binding processes like mediation. Jean
Sternlight notes that even ADR scholar Frank Sander made little
attempt to distinguish between binding arbitration and mediation
in a recent article even though he clearly knows the differences.252
She provides lengthy footnotes showing that many ADR advocates
and critics lump mediation and arbitration together, 23 as do
legislators254 and business groups. 5 Jethro K. Lieberman and
James F. Henry noticed the lack of a generally accepted abstract or
theoretical definition of alternative dispute resolution in a 1985
study. 5 ' Instead, they suggested that they be considered as "a set
of practices,"257 and they overlooked the differences in statements
such as "since the very premise of ADR is that it is a consensual
process designed to circumvent judicial process." 8 Lieberman and
Henry conclude that "[w]e therefore need a typology of disputes to
help determine which kinds of cases are amenable to ADR and
25 9
which should be left to the traditional devices of adjudication."
Thus, Lieberman and Henry focus on the differences in the
dispute, rather than the significant differences between ADR
processes.
Legal educators may contribute to a lack of appreciation for
the differences between arbitration and other non-judicial
251. But see Rau, supra note 175, at 532 (comparing European arbitrators
who are accustomed to reasoned awards with the American practice of

dispensing with such awards in arbitration). Rau points to American legal
education, where students so carefully hone the "skills of deconstructing
judicial opinions" and where they are "so laboriously trained to debunk their
explanatory power." Id. at 532. These are the reasons American lawyers no
longer believe in "the presence of opinions as an indispensable element of a

just decision." Id.
252. See Sternlight, supra note 244, at 97 (referring to Frank E.A. Sander,
The Futureof ADR, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 3, 3 (2000)).
253. See id. at 111 (citing a list of several articles).

254. Id.
255. Id. See also Deloitte & Touche, Deloitte & Touche Litigation Services
1993 Survey of General and Outside Counsels, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (ADR) (1993) (noting that those who still hesitate to use ADR are
fearful because of uncertainty and unpredictability of the results).
256. James K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Symposium on Litigation
Management: Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U
.CHI. L.REV. 424, 425-26 (1986).

257. Id. at 425-26.
258. Id. at 435; also Cole, supra note 85, at 1200. "ADR is built primarily on
a party autonomy model; party consent is the nearly exclusive guiding
principle for process design." Id.
259. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 256, at 438.
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processes by offering courses where all "non-litigious methods are
lumped 'into one ADR blob.'2 60
According to Sternlight, this confusion may lead some
business lawyers to counsel against arbitration where they have
had a bad experience with mediation; they might not like the
'touchy-feely' aspect of mediation and prefer arbitration where
they expect the arbitrators to apply a rule of law, but more
quickly, privately and at lower cost than would a judge.6 1
Although she does not comment on the reverse, where an attorney
with a good experience in mediation might expect the same ability
to reject the "resolution" offered by the arbitrator, Professor
Sternlight might ascribe this false expectation to the confusion.262
Leonard Riskin and James Westbrook discuss the confusion
about terminology in their text, Dispute Resolution for Lawyers, 62
and Stipanowich's analysis of statute based arbitration cases leads
him to conclude that the courts have expanded the application of
arbitration law to enforce mediation and step clauses beyond the
intentions of the drafters of the applicable legislation. 6 ' In one
case the court carefully determined that the FAA did not apply to
a dispute resolution clause in a real estate contract and then it
applied the Illinois version of the UAA to stay judicial
260. Sternlight, supra note 244, at 98. The author chooses to compare
mediation and arbitration in an LLM course for those who want to specialize
in commercial real estate transactions on the theory that transactional
lawyers will benefit from understanding the differences and will often choose
mediation.
The course is called "ADR in Real Estate: Mediation and
Arbitration."
The goals are to acquaint students with the applicable
substantive law, to encourage student participation in simulations as counsel
for parties but not as neutrals, or "arbitration wannabees" (a term coined by
Scott Carfello, regional vice president of the AAA who co-teaches the course),
and to develop skill in drafting appropriate mediation and arbitration
provisions for typical documents, e.g. real estate sales contracts, leases,
construction contracts, loan documents. The LLM Program at John Marshall
Law School has a separate required course, Drafting and Negotiations Skills
Workshop. In the future, this orientation to educating our students intending

to enter transactional practice should decrease the common reaction from
colleagues upon learning that a professor is engaging in scholarship about
ADR, "Just what is the difference between arbitration and mediation?" as

reported by Stipanowich from "a relatively sophisticated practitioner with
more than two decades of general commercial and real estate practice under
his belt inquired." Stipanowich, supra note 53, at n.17.
261. Sternlight, supra note 86, at 44.
262. Although my empirical research purposely avoids comparing
expectations regarding arbitration and mediation due to my concerns about

confusion, the survey does disclose some respondents who expect to be able to
reject the award in arbitration if they do not like it. See supra notes 227-230,

and accompanying text (noting the confusion of most members of the legal
profession concerning arbitration).
263. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR
LAWYERS 7 (2d ed. 1997).
264. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 860-63.
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proceedings. 65
As Stipanowich remarks, "an unremarkable
opinion - except that the dispute resolution provision called for
mediation, not binding arbitration."266
He urges courts to
appreciate the real differences between ADR processes and warns
of the dangers of misapplying arbitration statutes and their case
law to mediation. 67
To the extent courts confuse these processes, the
"voluntariness" of parties' choice of a non-litigation method of
resolving their disputes is undermined. 66
Lumping together
arbitration that has been selected by the parties after a dispute
arises with arbitration forced upon the parties by pre-dispute
arbitration clauses also inhibits careful analysis of the arbitral
process."'
E. Vigorous Marketing of ADR Contributes to the "Myths"
It may be that the vigorous marketing of ADR contributes to
this confusion, as well as to a lack of transparency about
arbitration.270 Christopher Drahozal characterizes ADR as an
"industry" where many of the players are repeaters. 1 In the
market for dispute resolution services, the arbitrators compete
with each other for selection by disputants, which is not the case
for the judiciary.272 Jurists often see work as arbitrators to be the
next stage in their career paths.272 Rau considers this arbitrator
self-interest in trying to expand prospects for appointment to be a
"structural bias" that is rarely discussed, and which contributes to
the lack of transparency about the process and to the lack of
information-the source of "confusion" of many including

265. See Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 861 (discussing Cecala v. Moore, 982
F. Supp 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).

266. Id.
267. Id. at 863.
268. Drahozal, supra note 249, at 579 (explaining that the confusion of the
general public may be exacerbated by media treatment). For example, in an

episode of the TV show Seinfeld, characters decide to get an "impartial
mediator" for a contract dispute, but in reality wanted and hired an arbitrator

to make the ultimate decision.
269. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, Contract Provisions
Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes: The Tradition of Revocabililty
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author), available at
http://www.roscoepound.org/new/carrington.pdf (last visited April 6, 2003)
(arguing for a return to the policy of allowing either party to revoke a pre-

dispute arbitration clause after a dispute arises). If Levin is correct about
"voluntariness" being most significant, then whether or not both sides embrace
the process at the time of the hearing is important.
270. Drahozal, supra note 249, at 585-88.

271. Id. at 588.
272. Id. at 586-87.
273. Id. at 586-88.
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attorneys about alternatives to litigation. 7 ' Experience in this
marketplace finds few, if any, arbitrators who will criticize the
process or provide suggestions on how to alter the standard
features of the arbitration provision.275 Moreover, arbitration
providers like the AAA, JAMS Arbitration Resolution Experts,
National Arbitration Forum and the Center for Public Resources
(CPR) Institute for Dispute Resolution are in the business of
administering arbitration services.276 Without court enforcement
of arbitration clauses and awards and without client use of
arbitration by clients, they would not succeed financially. 77 These
provider firms are really the 'brokers' of arbitration, going between
the arbitrators and the parties.
They market arbitration
heavily.276
This need to market arbitration services makes it more
difficult to dispel some of the "myths" 2 79 that have developed about
the process. 8 The marketing of "ADR" as a process where the
parties are supposed to be in control with more informal hearings,
more speed and more efficiency can be a disappointment to those
who actually try arbitration, which is becoming much more like
litigation. 2 1 There is an absence of empirical evidence to support
the marketing myth that arbitration is necessarily faster, cheaper
and otherwise better than litigation.2 Sarah Rudolph Cole notices
274. Rau, supra note 175, at 521.
275. Id. at 520-21.
276. See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 878 (discussing the role and
protection of "providers" including providing neutrals, or "intervenors," with
immunity from liability for dispute resolution-related activities).
277. Drahozal, supranote 249, at 589.
278. Brunet, supra note 202, at 53-54.
279. Sternlight, supra note 9, at 674 (explaining that the term "myth" is
used to describe the U.S. Supreme Court's preference since 1983 for
arbitration over litigation, its conclusion that the FAA preempts all protective
state legislation, and its "assurance" that arbitration will be just as fair to the
parties).
280. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 5, at 108 (analyzing the mythology that
arbitration and mediation will produce optimal results for both the employer
and the employee-an "assumption of efficiency" that has resulted in an
increase of pre-dispute arbitration clauses).
281. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 86, at 36 (citing Steven Shavell,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1995), and criticizing his claim to discussions both mediation and arbitration;
yet, he states that all ADR processes "share the feature that a third party is
involved who offers an opinion or communicates information about the dispute
to the disputants," which typifies mediation, but not arbitration).
282. Sternlight, supra note 9 at 677-94 (stating that most studies have
examined longitudinal attitudes rather than objective measures, and that
commentators do not agree that it is cheaper than litigation).
It is often asserted by supporters of ADR, in general, and
Environmental ADR in particular, that alternative dispute resolution
techniques are desirable, in large measure, because of the considerable
savings that accrue from diverting cases from litigation to non-litigation
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both an interest of commercial parties to a greater judicialization
of arbitration, generally through agreements for enhanced judicial
review and an increased skepticism in society generally toward
arbitration." 3 The applicability of arbitration has expanded from
its beginnings as a system to resolve disputes quickly between
members of the medieval merchant class, conducting business at
fairs far from their homes. 84
It may be "the broad range of arbitration contexts today" that
makes it difficult to evaluate arbitration."' From a role in deciding
pure business disputes between merchants in its early history,
arbitration has expanded to disputes between employers and
employees, securities brokers and investors, lawyers and their
clients over fees, husbands and wives in divorce proceedings,
patients and doctors/hospitals in medical malpractice and, most
recently, plaintiffs and defendants in all sorts of civil rights
cases.286 Broadbrush evaluations of arbitration or, even less useful,
of ADR do not paint a clear picture. 87
Several commentators have even questioned the underlying
assumption of the myth that, but for arbitration, parties to
disputes would be stuck with full litigation.2 8 Statistics provided
by the Bureau of Justice in studying settlement behavior indicate
that trials are "rare, even freakish, events," and that only about
three percent of cases filed were tried to verdict.288
Furthermore, the marketing of arbitration has succeeded.

modes of resolution; yet, this is another theoretical area where serious

theory is lacking due, in considerable part, to deficient empirical data.
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 384.
283. Cole, supra note 85, at 1240.

284. Id.
285. Levin, supra note 46, at 161-63.
286. Robert F. Blomquist, Some (Mostly) Theoretical and (Very Brief)
Pragmatic Observations on Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution In
America, 34 VAL. U. L.REV. 343, 353 (noting that arbitration of disputes that

involve questions of private law, such as construction contracts and family
law, should be considered separately from disputes involving questions of
public law, such as international law, and disputes involving a mix of private
and public questions, such as labor law and environmental law). This
approach could lead to even more variation in analyses of arbitration as a
dispute resolution process. Id.
287. Levin, supra note 46, at 161-63.
288. See, e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN
APPROACH, 102-04 (2d ed. 1995) (cited in Sternlight, supra note 14, at 319).
289. Charles Silver, Symposium: What We Know and Do Not Know About the
Impact of Civil Justice on the American Economy and Policy: Does Civil
Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 2073, 2109-11 (2002) (reporting on

studies done by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts). See supra notes 207, 208, and 211 and
accompanying text (listing the rare circumstances in which a party to
arbitration may expect review of the substantive law).
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Although some of the data blurs arbitration and mediation, 9 ' the
providers report great increases in the number of arbitrations over
the past fifteen years."'
F. Lack of TransparencyAbout Arbitration

A lack of transparency about the arbitration process
contributes to the misinformation and confusion of transactional
lawyers and results in the lack of true assent to binding
arbitration.
Stipanowich describes a lack of clear and
understandable information about arbitration generally and about
a program offered by a particular provider as some of the cause for
concerns about systemic fairness in use of arbitration. 92 Even
relatively sophisticated attorneys may only have a general idea of
the differences between mediation and arbitration, let alone an
understanding of modern dispute resolution procedures that are
incorporated by reference in the contract. Arbitration rules can
run many pages and are subject to modification by the
institutional provider without notice.293 Many transactional
lawyers lack arbitration experience, which makes them especially
vulnerable. 94
For example, Brunet suggests that the use of "folklore
arbitration" which prohibits discovery, prohibits preliminary
hearing and forbids the arbitrator from issuing a written, reasoned
decision may be due to the parties' lack of experience and/or
knowledge. 29" He expects that knowledgeable parties, and their
advisor attorneys, will use a judicialized model, what he calls the
"contract model," which includes routine discovery, motion
practice, application of substantive rules of law, written awards
with findings of fact and reasons, and enhanced judicial review.296
"Asymmetrical information" about the arbitration process, for
290. See, e.g., Deloitte & Touche Survey, supra 255, at 10 (noting that a

survey of Fortune 1000 general counsel and large law firms involved with
litigation concluded that user's "effectiveness of ADR in settling certain types
of cases than they were about the effectiveness of the actual methods of ADR
suggests that there may still be room for improved methods of ADR," instead
of dealing more directly with approval of mediation and criticism of arbitration
by those surveyed).

291. Silver, supra note 289, at 2103 (discussing several of reports). See
Sabin, supra note 50, at 1339 (reporting that the American Arbitration
Association caseload grew from 92,100 in 1998 to 136,673 in 1999, a fortyeight percent increase in one year and over the five years of 1995-1998 an
increase of 145 percent).
292. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 890.
293. Id. at 891.
294. Thompson, supra note 211, at 156 (stating a survey of transactional
lawyers are less likely to have served as arbitrator or to have represented a
party, than are litigators).
295. Brunet, supra note 202, at 46.
296. Id. at 45.
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example the "tendency of some arbitrators to ignore the law," in
bargaining may make the giving up of rights by adopting a predispute arbitration provision less than consensual."' 7 Because the
contracts within which arbitration clauses are included are
usually confidential and not open to review by outsiders, it is
difficult to review draft clauses other than the boilerplate provided
by arbitration providers like the AAA.2"'
Even the courts may not fully understand all the
ramifications of binding arbitration. The FAA, which is cited as
authority for the enforceability of almost all arbitration
agreements, is "dense" and counsel have not provided much
illumination about the complicated relationship between the
private institution of arbitration and the public institutions which
are effected by increased use of it."'
The secrecy surrounding arbitration and the usual lack of
reasoned awards contributes to the lack of transparency. 3°0
Typically, third parties are excluded from hearings, there is no
transcript of the arbitration hearing, arbitrators will not be
required to testify regarding their activities and parties impose
strict confidentiality requirements on each other.3 ' Critics believe
that the non-public nature of arbitration proceedings and awards
undermines society's role in setting the terms of justice. The nonpublicity also may make it less likely that disputes will settle
before the arbitration process begins because of the uncertainty of
the outcome of arbitration.0 2
In his economic analysis of
arbitration agreements, Keith Hylton argues that arbitration
contributes to "erosion of the publicly accessible stock of common297. Brunet, supra note 5, at 115.
298. Drahozal, supra note 249, at 580.
299. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 338-39 (suggesting the
triumph of the academic movement of law and economics with its valuing of
efficiency above all else, including for example conscious choice in contracts,
may persuade courts to enforce contracts of a party "who unconsciously and
improvidently submits to an adverse choice of forum for the enforcement of his
rights .... ). More likely, the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court's,

opinions are the "product of underattention to practical consequences ..
at 339.

" Id.

300. See Cole, supra note 85, at 1234 (noting that arbitrators are not
required to publish their reasons and usually do not). See also Rau, supra
note 175, at 536 (explaining that this is only a default rule that can be
changed by contract drafting); The American Arbitration Association,
Commercial
Arbitration
rules,
Jul.
1,
1996,
available
at

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Documents/RPID%2ODocuments/
rp04048.html (last visited May 4, 2003) (stating the rules that permit either
party to request a reasoned award, but only if the request is made before the
hearings begin).

301. Brunet, supra note 202, at 45. These are characteristics of "folklore
arbitration" and support a primary process goal of privacy. Id.
302. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 9, at 695 (noting that privacy concerns

actually reduced the likelihood of cases being settled).

2003]

(Pre) (As) sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration Contracts

627

law rules" and hinders "the development of new rules." 3 ' In areas
where the law is not yet developed, the opportunity to apply a rule
of law and to develop a consistent set of rules is lost. 4
Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate either the process or
particular arbitrators except anecdotally from those who may
learn of the results of arbitration in a particular legal
community."0 A lack of accountability, based on the arbitrator's
freedom from the need to explain or justify an award,0 0 and no
public review of their activities or work product prevents
transactional lawyers, as well as those more directly involved in
the arbitration process, from getting the information necessary to
an informed opinion in selecting an arbitrator. Additionally,
repeat players have access to information about decision patterns
of a particular arbitrator that is not available to others in the
absence of any requirement that arbitrators disclose prior
It appears to be common practice for large
decisions." 7
organizations and law firms representing them to "keep databases
containing extensive background information on each potential
arbitrator, including how the arbitrator ruled in a number of cases
as well as the quality of his decision."0 0 This also means that the
"market" will be less likely to get rid of problem arbitrators 3°9 or
303. Keith Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 S. CT ECON REV. 209, 243 (2000).
304. Sternlight, supra note 9, at 686. The author has been made personally
aware of this downside of arbitration when she served as an arbitrator of a
predatory lending claim of a residential mortgage borrower. When the author
learned that other arbitrators were hearing similar cases involving the same
respondent, she realized that the opportunity for developing consistent rules
and for informing third parties was lost by the secrecy of the process. See id.
(citing a discussion of how arbitration's lack of precedent building and lack of
access to what would be public information in litigation is harmful, especially
to consumers).
305. Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 448. The AAA advises parties to
investigate prospective arbitrators, but this can be time consuming and costly
and nearly impossible especially because prospective arbitrators live and work
in distant places. Id. "Moreover, discussions with colleagues or acquaintances
may answer few questions about the effectiveness of a particular person as an
" because the names of parties and attorneys who may have
arbitrator ....
such information are not disclosed. Id.
306. Rau, supra note 175, at 529.
307. Id. at 524, n.145.
308. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 477 (1996). The court acknowledged that
one of the parties had a large database of information about the rulings of
certain arbitrators that was not available to the other side. Id. at n.127. See
also Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
927, 932-33 (noting that the arbitration system is clearly dominated by repeat
clients).
309. See Brunet, supra note 202, at 52 (noting how easy it is to become an

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:589

problem aspects of the arbitration process. Most of the criticism of
the latter is from academics who base their recommendations on
theoretical difficulties with the structure rather than empirical
evidence of what really is happening.31 °
G. The Experience of TransactionalLawyers, or Lack Thereof,
with Arbitration
To the extent transactional lawyers have any experience with
the arbitration process as arbitrator or representative of a party in
arbitration,311 they are misled. Their experience is that arbitrators
are usually attorneys or former judges31 and that parties in
arbitration make legal arguments and submit "briefs."33
According to survey respondents, arbitrators will often "rule" on
legal issues." 4 This leads survey participants to expect the
arbitrator to know and to follow a rule of law.315 The clear
immunity of arbitrators from liability for any conduct during
arbitration reflects a tendency to treat arbitrators like judges.1
However, judges are not selected to hear cases based on how they
are expected to decide them. The concept of an "independent
judiciary" is central to our system of justice.317 Yet, even Judge
Posner has recognized and approved the lack of independence of

arbitrator; with few barriers and no regulation). "[It is not difficult to hold
out oneself as an arbitrator." Id.
310. However, recent empirical studies by academics may indicate a shift in
legal scholarship from the doctrinal to empirical.
311. See Hammond Survey, supra note 201, at question #18 (showing that,
out of 137 transactional lawyers, only thirty-four had experience with
arbitration from serving as a representative of a party or as an arbitrator;
while out of sixty-five litigation lawyers, thirty have served as arbitrators or
representatives of parties).
312. Id. at questions #48, #26.
313. Id. at questions #15, #16.
314. Id. at questions #17, #30.
315. Id.; see Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COL. L. REv.
846, 861 (1961) (reporting that, in 1961 a reported survey of arbitrators by the
American Arbitration Association showed eighty percent of the experimental
arbitrators thought that they should reach decisions "within the context of the
principles of substantive rules of law but almost ninety percent believed that
they were free to ignore these rules whenever they thought that more just
decisions would be reached by so doing."). See also Thomson, supra note 211,
at 154-55, n.69 (citing a survey of AAA construction arbitrators in 1993).
316. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 876. "[T]he immunity of arbitrators
from liability in the performance of their arbitral role is very well-established
under U.S. arbitration law ....
[T]he principle is founded upon the functional
comparability of arbitrator to judges, whose immunity is based upon the need
to protect their impartiality and to shield them from undue influence in the
course of decision making." Id.; see also Sternlight, supra note 9, at 673
(noting that the U. S. Supreme Court asserted that arbitrators are as capable
as judges without any empirical proof).
317. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 132, at 346.
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arbitrators as a "tradeoff between impartiality and expertise."318
Moreover, the attorney who counsels business clients often
does so through "legal opinions of counsel" which are the
attorney's best guess as to what the client's position should beoften one that is in Brunet's words, "close to the line-the optimal
business posture for the firm consistent with the law." 19 Brunet
decries the compromise awards in arbitration as a negative return
on the legal advice for which business clients have hired their
attorneys. 20 He discusses the compromise arbitration awards and
awards based on "equity" in the context of arbitrators granting
discretionary bonuses to highly skilled Wall Street traders and
investment bankers in 2000.321 As a matter of law, the bonuses
were completely a discretionary decision of management and had
not been provided for by the employment contract.322
Yet,
arbitration panels awarded significant bonuses to several traders
and investment bankers even though they were discharged prior
to receiving the bonuses.323 Brunet suggests that these awards
may be based on an arbitrator's "equity-based compromise
'instinct' of fairness."321 Surely, the Wall Street firm, which likely
had received a legal opinion that "bonus payments to traders who
were discharged were wholly discretionary" and a decision entirely
left to management, would question the value of such legal
services which had not warned of the unreviewability of
arbitration awards.325
Only a client who analyzes a situation and concludes that a
compromise would be more beneficial than its legal position would
be, actively embraces binding arbitration. However, the "deals"
are made with little attention to dispute resolution alternatives
upfront.326
H. The Disconnect Between Litigation and TransactionalLawyers
Finally, the "disconnect" between litigators and transactional
attorneys even within the same law firm means that the latter are

318. Rau, supra note 175, at 487. It has also been suggested that arbitrators
be held to a more relaxed standard than that of public judicial officers. Id. at

494. However, the court holds that insisting on the isolation of arbitrators
from eminent partiality may be unrealistic. Id.
319. Brunet, supra note 5, at 112. It is reasonable to assume that "[ilf these

firms chose to follow substantive rules, they probably want to have legal rules
applied with care to their disputes." Id.
320. Id. at 112-13.
321. Id. at 113.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 113.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text (noting that
transactional lawyers focus on the "marriage," not the "divorce").
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not likely to be well informed about arbitration."'
Tom
Stipanowich comments that "[t]ransactional lawyers, those in the
best position to offer advice and counsel in the structuring of
contractual conflict management options, tend to be less well
informed than colleagues in what are traditionally known as
litigation departments." 8 Stipanowich reports comments of a
litigation partner of a leading Boston law firm:
I found one of the problems was that many of these ADR issues were
addressed by my transactional corporate partners, who didn't like
me tinkering with the ADR provisions at the end of deals so they
couldn't close the transaction. Unfortunately, the clauses they used
were often taken out of form books and not really discussed between
the parties. Now, we have begun to change the culture so that the
transactional lawyers call me and consult about ADR language.
They don't just stick something in out of a form book, but consult
someone who can actually help tailor a clause to the particular
circumstances.329
Transactional lawyers do not communicate productively until
after a dispute arises and the transactional lawyer asks the
litigators for an analysis of the case. Of course, they expect the
analysis to be based on the rule of law applied to the facts, which
may not produce a realistic assessment if the right to litigate has
been waived and replaced with an obligation to arbitrate.330 All of
the above contribute to the misinformed status of transactional
attorneys who will be advising clients about including an
arbitration clause or not and about whether or not to draft around
the "folklore arbitration" clause and in what ways. The FAA did
not contemplate enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration clause
where the "disparate knowledge" of the parties in understanding
both the nature of potential future dispute and the differences
between arbitration and litigation is so likely.3 '
327. See text accompanying note 411 (demonstrating that litigators are more

accurate in their understanding of and expectations about arbitration).
328. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 834.
329. Id. at n18.
330. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (noting that this mistake
stems as much from the behavior of the transactional lawyers, trying not to
raise the possibility of a "divorce" at the beginning of the disagreement, as
from any antipathy between the two groups of attorneys).
331. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 69. Schwartz was discussing pre-dispute

arbitration clauses in a contract of adhesion, but some of the same
considerations apply in the commercial context. Id.; see also Stipanowich,
supra note 53, at 880 (discussing Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. New
York City Transit Authority, 623 N.E.2d 531, 534 (N.Y. 1993), where the court

refused to invalidate the arbitration clause because Westinghouse acted "with
its business eyes open, to accept the terms, specifications and risk of the bid
contract, including the ADR clause.").
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IV. ASCENDANCY OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH IN THE LAST TWO
DECADES HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP GENERALLY AND FOR
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PARTICULAR

A. Changes In Legal Scholarship
No longer will the author do research based solely on opinions
of appellate courts. As a new academic in the 1970s, the author
had planned to do what would now be called empirical research on
unconscionable provisions in standard, form residential leases.
The author began to solicit copies of such leases from real estate
broker organizations and bar associations nationwide with the
intention of examining such leases and collecting data on the
presence of offending clauses. The author's theory was that
despite changes in the law that made such provisions illegal and
unenforceable, they remained a part of most leases. Based on this
author's years of experience as a legal-services attorney, this
author's theory, when included in printed form, was that, the
clauses gave leases the appearance of validity and a binding effect
in the eyes of residential landlords and tenants. After collecting
data, the plan was to make inferences about whether leases
generally included the provisions. Additionally, conclusions would
be drawn about whether certain changes in the law, mostly in case
law, had resulted in compliance in the negotiated, "take it or leave
it," leases signed by most tenants.
Doctrinal research uncovered an article by Curtis Berger in
the Columbia Law Review.33 Berger had a very different view of
his task of research and writing. His approach was to review all
103 reported New York appellate cases from 1970-72 to determine
how those courts had dealt with "unconscionable" clauses in
residential leases.333 The obvious and serious limitation of this
approach was that it would only trace what courts did in one
jurisdiction with the relatively few leases those courts reviewed
during the period. Nevertheless, Curtis Berger's scholarship
preempted my own.
A second, early teaching experience brought about an
empirical approach to this research. In the author's Estates and
Trusts course, at least three Statutes of Intestate Succession are
compared by the students." ' These are default rules, where the
332. See Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
791 (1974) (researching arbitration clauses in standard residential leases).
Berger deserves recognition as well for his success in making transactional
real estate an acceptable research field, and for supporting the development of
a separate section on Real Estate Transactions within the AALS, scheduled to
occur in 2004.
333. Id. at 792.
334. These three statutes are usually a very old version that incorporates

principles of primogeniture, the current Illinois version, and the Uniform
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decedent neglected to make a valid will, and they allegedly mirror
the presumed intention of the decedent, that is, what the decedent
would have directed in a valid will. The provision in many state
versions in the late 1970s and early 1980s provided that if the
decedent died survived by a spouse and children, even minor
children, a substantial portion of her estate would go to the
children." 5 That such a distribution of a decedent's estate would
be the actual choice of most decedents is highly doubtful."6
Over the last several years, the author studied arbitration
and mediation as alternatives to litigation of commercial real
estate disputes along with implications of pre-dispute binding
arbitration clauses.337 Not only did a party to arbitration give up a
"right to trial," the party also "voluntarily" gave up a right to a
rule of law, the right to a reasoned award and the right to judicial
review by agreeing to arbitrate.338
Early concerns and research focused on commercial real
estate transactions-acquisitions, financing, construction, leasing,
ownership and management of land. The legal issues that arose
there were familiar and drew attention to the skills that the
attorneys who facilitate the deals must develop. 339 Therefore, cases
dealing with arbitration clauses within commercial real estate
documents were reviewed. To the extent these opinions disclosed

Probate Code.
335. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-11 (Michie 2002); CAL. PROB. CODE §
6401 (West 2002); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1 (2002).
336. Year after year my students complained that the typical decedent would
have chosen to give all of her 'estate to the surviving spouse. Yet, the
legislature as representative of the citizens had thought otherwise.
337. Definitions of "binding arbitration" often emphasize the process, rather

than a comparison with litigation. See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 53, at
840 (listing the essentials: "a) an agreement[;] b) to settle controversies[;] c)
through an adjudicative process[;] d) before a private third party or parties[;]
e) who render a legally binding award."

338. Although the author served as an AAA arbitrator and as an
attorney/arbitrator with the Cook County Mandatory Arbitration Program
since its inception, she did not appreciate these basics about the arbitration

process. The author participated in bar associations, particularly with
practicing real estate lawyers as a member of the American Bar Association
Section on Real Property Probate and Trust Law, the Chicago Bar Association

Real Property Law Committee and the American College of Real Estate
Lawyers. These experiences suggested that her own lack of knowledge and
her expectations were typical of transactional lawyers generally. The author
would like to thank the attorneys in the above organizations for providing

insights that helped the structure of her empirical study. These colleagues
included Janet Johnson of Schiff, Hardin, & Waite; Margery Newman, Stanley
Sklar, and Tom Homburger of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd; Barry Hawkins of Shipman
& Goodwin; and Michael Kim of Arnstein & Lehr.
339. The author purposely did not look at residential transactions because
they would more closely fit within the research being conducted in the
consumer, employment, and civil rights arenas.
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the language of the clauses, they tended to be AAA boilerplate. " °
Even though the clauses could be modified, few of the cases dealt
with clauses drafted to reflect the kind of close scrutiny by
attorneys and their clients which the author had come to expect on
various other aspects of deals.34'
The author reviewed review of materials distributed
primarily at bar conferences34 to ascertain what was happening in
practice. 43 Thus, the perspective and knowledge of some of the
most sophisticated commercial real estate attorneys could be
examined,344 but information about whether and to what extent
those who advised clients applied this knowledge was missing.
B. University of Illinois Law Review Conference, April 2001
A research conference presented by the University of Illinois
Law Review in Spring 2001315 inspired the empirical direction of
this article.
At this conference, presenters documented and
validated this trend in legal scholarship. Three of the authors
have shared drafts of their articles, which will be among the most
recent on topic of empirical research within the legal academy.
Professor Shari Seidman Diamond's clear definition of
empirical legal research as based upon observation requires
qualitative as well as quantitative analysis: "[G]ood empirical
research typically involves the systematic organization of a series
of observations with the method of data collection and analysis
made available to the audience." 6 She uses as an example of
340. See, e.g., Waldron v. Goddess, 460 N.Y.S.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983);
Sagonowsky v. More, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Pardee
Contruction Co. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(showing cases where binding arbitration within commercial real estate that
state that they are boilerplate).
341. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993)
342. For example, the annual meetings of the ABA usually include at least
one session on drafting ADR provisions.
343. In some ways this reminds me of my earlier interest in examining to
what extent lease clauses reflected the state of the law.
344. At least some of whom are more involved with litigation than
transactional work.
345. It was entitled, "Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law." The
University of Illinois Law Review will publish a symposium issue of articles
from that conference in the near future.
346. Shari Seidman Diamond, Symposium: Empirical and Experimental
Methods of Law: Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphis and
Plankton, U. ILL. L. REv. 803, 805 (2002); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2002). "What makes research
empirical is that it is based on observations of the world. These facts may be
historical or contemporary, based on legislation or case law, the results of
interviews or surveys, or the outcomes of secondary archival research or
primary data collections." Id. Epstein and King add, "in terms of legal
scholarship, it is only the purely normative or theoretical that is not
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empirical research an interview study that compiles a report on
the percentage of respondents who thought they were entitled to
sue, but chose not to as "quantitative." An alternative version of
the same study might focus on describing the range of responses
that injured individuals make regarding their injuries without any
attempt at assessing the frequency of particular responses, which
is still empirical, but non-quantitative. A non-empirical approach
to the same theme might be a description or model that predicts,
"based on the scholar's assumptions about what might motivate
people to sue," how people will react to an injury under various
circumstances. 47 Although, the model may be based in part on
empirical research, it actually is not "empirical"-it is merely
susceptible to empirical research methods showing that many
people do not enlist the help of the legal system in such
circumstances.348
Diamond describes a scholar who analyzes when an
individual should be entitled to turn to the legal system for help
following an injury, whom she concludes is conducting traditional
normative legal scholarship. It only becomes "empirical" research
when, and if, the scholar attempts to examine how people actually
behave." '
In surveying recent work at the American Bar
Foundation where she is a senior research fellow, Diamond
summarizes what all empirical research has in common,
"orientation to evidence that requires more than armchair
speculation."3 50
Her clever, engaging "Typology of Empiricism" chart describes
how law scholars use and react to empirical methods.3 ' Using
comparisons with marine life-the Clam, the Dolphin, and
Plankton-she provides a basis for those who are unsure whether
their research is truly empirical0 . and how the response of their

empirical." Id. (emphasis added).
See also Richard Revesz, Exchange:
Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship- A Defense of
Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 171 (2002) (noting that
the author's view is more restrictive than Epstein and King's in that "[it
focuses on econometric analyses, and its examples are drawn primarily from
studies of judicial behavior.").
347. Diamond, supra note 346, at 804.

348. Id.
349. Id. at 805.
The author's work in studying the knowledge and
expectations of commercial, transactional attorneys regarding binding

arbitration fits into the first category that Professor Diamond describes: "For
empiricists studying the law, the question is usually about how law and legal

institutions actually behave and with what effects. For non-empiricists, the
question more often is about how they ought to behave." Id. at 806.
350. Id. at 807.
351. Id. at fig. 1.
352. See Epstein & King, supra note 346 (mounting a forceful attack on
empirical research); see also Revesz, supra note 346, at 169 (criticizing Epstein
and King's attack on empirical research).
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academic colleagues may range. The "clams," in the ocean as well
as in the country's law schools, are "relatively immobile" creatures
who, because they lack the eyes and a distinct head, are very
limited in their ability to actively search their environment.
"Dolphins" are "active inhabitants of the marine environment
whose intelligence, ingenuity and playfulness" are well known. 54
They are crucial to the survival of empirical legal scholarship
because they can be the "source of energy and perspective" for
academia and because they are able to recognize weaknesses in
conclusions drawn from some research."' 5 "Plankton," a "large
category of organic and inorganic material which exists in 3 a56
drifting, floating state too weak to swim against the current,"
corresponds to academics who use or provide empirical research
without actually contributing directly to the field, who use it as
arguing for or against empiricism
the "method of the moment,
357
depending on the season."
Within each species, Diamond identifies three categories: the
Doer; the User; and the Critic. She expects that the distinction
between the doers, users, and critics will not be as telling in
predicting the future of empirical research as the distinction
between the species. 59 The "Dolphin/User" is at the center of the
matrix.3 60 This type is "intellectual squarely rooted in the
traditional legal academy" while recognizing the possibilities that
empirical inquiry can offer.3 6' As compared with the clams, the
Dolphin/User is able to do central processing, which involves
evaluating the fit between the theory and method used, while the
clam can only engage in peripheral processing, adopting the
conclusion of an empiricist merely because it has been published. 6
Thus, many Dolphin/Users are traditionally bound academics who
have collaborated with social scientists. 63
Diamond, supra note 346, at 808.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
353.
354.
355.
356.

359. Id.

360. Id. at 814. According to Diamond, the Dolphin/Doer is not nearly as
crucial to acceptance of empirical legal research over the long run; although,
like the Dolphin/User, such scholars have a "[deep] involvement with
empirical research" and a "habitual pattern of interaction" with Dolphin Users
and Critics. Id. at 817. These are scholars for whom empirical research is a
method of scholarship and includes many who have Ph.D.s in social science
disciplines. Id.
361. Id. at 814.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 815. See, e.g., KALVEN HARRY, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). See also JOHN THIBAUT, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975)
(noting the procedural justice work of Laurens Walker with the author).

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:589

Another conference participant, Michael Heise, traces the
development of empirical research historically, pointing to both
the emerging professionalization of law and the modern American
law school model, the case method, at the turn of the Twentieth
Century as leaving little room for empirical legal scholarship. 64
"Periodic Spurts" of such scholarship was produced during the
Legal Realism Movement.3 6 5 Four factors in the period after World
War II contributed to a forward movement: 1) the Chicago Jury
Project at the University of Chicago Law School; 2) the creation of
Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law at Yale University; 3)
the financial support reaching a critical mass; and 4) the
development of the Law and Society Association and its Law
3 6 and
Society Review, and the current "emerging new empiricism." 1
Heise theorizes that three groups of factors explain the reemergence of empirically based legal scholarship. 67 First, "as
specific lines of theoretical or doctrinal research mature the
potential contribution of empirical or experimental work
increases." 8 As key assumptions are identified and transformed
into hypotheses, they are susceptible to empirical testing. 369 And
the sheer increase in the volume of what is accepted as legal
scholarship and the breadth of issues considered enhances
possibilities for empirical research.370
Secondly, Heise credits
changes in those who produce legal scholarship from those who
only were trained in law schools to those who have multiple
graduate degrees, including Ph.Ds. 371' Finally, the growing number
and accessibility of datasets specifically developed with legal
scholarship in mind and, with it, calls from the courts for
empirical work spurs on empirical legal research.372
Using Empirical Judicial Decision-making Scholarship as a
case study for the purpose of reviewing and evaluating a variety of
models,373 Heise concludes that because of limitations imposed by
data,374 research design and statistical methods, the empirical
364. See generally Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical
Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decisionmaking and the New Empiricism (2000)

(unpublished manuscript on file with the author and THE UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW).

365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

5-6.
7-9.
13.
14.

369. See id. at 15 (setting forth the key assumption of "voluntariness" about
binding commercial arbitration which is the basis for the author's hypothesis
about the knowledge and expectations of transactional lawyers which, in turn,

"beg for" empirical testing).
370. Heise, supra note 364, at 15.

371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 53. Brunet, supra note 5, at 110. Brunet attributes a feature of
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perspective remains "only a tool," to enhance traditional legal
scholarship."'

Thomas Ulen claims that "recent scholarly trends in the law
show evidence of a movement toward an even more science-like
discipline."376 In discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,7 where the Court

laid out a four-step inquiry as to what is required for testimony to
be considered "science," Ulen sees similarities between his own
characteristics of science and the scientific method.7
He
compares some questions that might be resolved by logical
argumentation with others that would be better solved by
empirical observation. 9 Uen relies on Thomas Kuhn's paradigm
shift explanation for scientific revolutions,8 ' and predicts, for
example, that the prevailing paradigm of the social sciences,
rational choice theory, 3 1 is likely to be replaced
because so many
32
anomalous behaviors are not explained by it.
Ulen argues that several factors explain why the study of law
is not yet a "legal science" susceptible to a Nobel Prize. 83 He finds
a puzzling lack of "a core, shared theory across national
boundaries in the academic study of law" and an absence of
empirical and experimental work as compared to other social
sciences.3 8 He contends this has been changing since the shift
from legal formalism to legal realism in the 1930s and 1940s.385
the Corporate Library database he used in researching conduct of employer
and employee in "high stakes" employment contracts, that "it reports only the
terms of the completed CEO contracts and fails to show the multiphase
process of negotiating agreements" as a limitation on his empirical study. Id.
The Corporate Library is accessible on the web. Id.
375. Heise, supra note 364, at 53.
376. Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical
Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875,
876 (2002) (forthcoming publication on file with THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
LAW REVIEW and the author).
377. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
378. Ulen, supra note 376, at 881.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 884. Anomalies to the prevailing paradigm may gather to such
an extent that adjusting the latter no longer succeeds. Id. A new paradigm is
eventually developed or proposed that supplants the existing one because it
can account for both the phenomena explained by the older paradigm and the
anomalies. Id.
381. Id. at 886. It has been used in examining economic phenomena in
related disciplines including political science, international relations and law.
See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051 (2000) (summarizing rational choice theory as "expected utility
theory" as well as a "self-interest" theory").
382. Ulen, supra note 376, at 887.
383. Id. at 899.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 900.
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With the realist's notion that the evaluation of a law should
include its likely consequences comes the need for empirical work.
Yet, most empirical work over the past sixty years has been
descriptive rather than analytical according to Ulen.386
However, he discerns a move in legal scholarship towards a
true scientific approach like that prevailing in other social,
natural, physical, and behavioral sciences."' This is possible due
to increasingly comprehensive theories that he argues are
prerequisites to any science. 8 ' Law and economics provides such a

comprehensive theory that, for example, maintains that rules and
standards of property law "should (and largely does) foster the
efficient use of society's scarce resources."38 He predicts that this
will lead to "increasing attempts to engage in analytical empirical
work designed to establish the truth of hypotheses about legal
topics derived from that core theory."3 "8 Critical Legal Studies and
Law and Society research may also provide the same
comprehensive theoretical goals that will lead to empirical work.8 1
Ulen ends his article with a report of Robert C. Ellickson's
empirical study of legal scholarship, which showed that between
1982 and 1996 law professors and students have been more
inclined to produce quantitative analyses.8 2
Besides, Ulen
believes that legal scholars are now directing their work towards
other legal scholars, rather than towards the practicing bar and
judges as in the past.3 3 He expects this to change the direction of
legal scholarship.894
C. Need For EmpiricalResearch About Knowledge And
Expectation Of TransactionalLawyers
Attending the University of Illinois conference and the
subsequent colloquy with colleagues Professors Julie Spanbauer
and Janice Mueller, led to a Lexis search of "empir! and arbit!,"
386. Id. at 901.
387. Id. at 909.
388. Id.

389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 910. Ulen sees the convergence internationally of the standard
U.S. model of business organization "in which the corporation is seen as a

nexus of contracts and elements of corporate law seek to maximize

shareholder wealth" as a potential core theory in corporate law that may serve
as the basis for empirical study. Id.
392. Id. at 913 (citing Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A
StatisticalStudy, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 528-29 (2000)).
393. Id. at 916. "[The ascendant source of prestige among legal scholars
today is the high esteem of fellow academics." Id. See also Harry T. Edwards,
The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L.REV. 34 (1992) (discussing the trend in which legal scholars seek

the esteem to their collegues).
394. Ulen, supra note 376, at 915.

2003]

(Pre) (As) sumed "'Consent"of Commercial Binding Arbitration Contracts

639

where no reports of empirical studies of attitudes and expectations
of transactional lawyers about binding arbitration were found to
test the previously mentioned theories." 5
Some legal scholars have even questioned the anecdotal
evidence that "arbitration is becoming more widely used than it
has in the past," because it is difficult to get evidence about the
widespread nature of arbitration agreements. 9
While the
arbitration institutions keep records on caseload filings, there is a
dearth of record keeping on what parties are agreeing to before
there is a dispute.397 Drahozal notes that in thirteen states,
franchise contracts must be filed and are therefore available to
researchers.398 Brunet suggests the Corporate Library database
for examination of CEO contracts, 39 9 but neither resource provides
data on the process by which pre-dispute arbitration clauses are

included.9

°

D. Alternative Dispute Resolution Generally
Indeed, there are few empirical studies about ADR,4 ' and
even fewer about the functioning of transactional lawyers with
respect to it. 402 Andrea Kupfer Schneider updated a 1976 empirical
study that had been conducted by surveying 1,000 lawyers in
Phoenix about their most recent negotiation experiences. °3 She
surveyed 2,500 Milwaukee and Chicago lawyers about their most

395. The author thanks her friend Susan C. Haddad, J.D. '77, The John

Marshall Law School, for her suggestion that the author join her in taking a
course Social Science Research in the summer of 2001, which provided basic
information about empirical research and set some ground rules for the
author's survey.
396. Drahozal, supra note 249, at 580.
397. Id. Drahozal contends that it would be less likely that parties would
choose arbitration after their dispute arose because, at that point, the parties
would have "fairly divergent views or interests." Id. It is more common for
the agreement to submit to arbitration to be made at the time the contract is
signed. Id.
398. Id. at 580-81.
399. Brunet, supra note 5, at 109-10.
400. Id.
401. See Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 835 (noting the author's reference to
his own studies in the field of construction arbitration).
402. Id. Stipanowich suggests that a lack of empirical data makes it difficult
to evaluate how effectively arbitration works. Stipanowich, supra note 42, at
432. A 1991 survey conducted by the ABA Forum on the Construction
Industry failed to ask questions about the respondents' law practice; this
means that there is no way to evaluate whether the group was representative
of the construction bar and offers no data separating litigators from
transactional lawyers.
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration:
Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction Industry, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 83 (1996).
403. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15-46
(West Group 1983).
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recent negotiation experience to compare perceived, subjective
negotiation behavior with perceived effectiveness in negotiation." 4
She concluded that "as adversarial negotiators have gotten more
extreme over the past twenty-five years, they also have become
both nastier and less effective."' 5 She recommends a problem
solving, rather than adversarial approach for attorneys engaged in
negotiations, at least based on the survey participants own
perceptions as to which behavior works." 6 Although she did not
separate out respondents based upon categories of "transactional"
versus "litigators," it is likely that some of those surveyed were
transactional lawyers because of the selection method used.0 7 One
thousand names were randomly selected from the membership of
the Wisconsin State Bar Association, particularly Milwaukee
County and two neighboring counties, and 1500 names were
randomly selected from the membership of the Chicago Bar
Association. ' °"
Similarly, a recent article by Dwight Golann studies outcomes
in specific, private mediation cases by interviewing professional
mediators.0 0 His goal was to determine, in cases where there
already was a relationship between the parties, whether mediators
were able to facilitate repairs of relationships, 0 which has been
touted as an advantage of mediation over litigation.'
1. Arbitration
Published empirical studies of arbitration are limited and do
not involve the perspective of transactional attorneys. Deloitte &
Touche performed a study of law firm attorneys specializing in
litigation and the general counsels of Fortune 1000 companies
about their experiences with ADR during the three-year period
from 1990-1992.412 From the 813 legal departments and 1,400 law
firms who were sent the survey,4' 1 two hundred forty-six (eleven
404. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Perception, Reputation and Reality, An
Empirical Study of Negotiation Skills, DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE,

Summer 2000, at 24, 24-25.

405. Id. at 27.
406. Id. at 28.
407. Id. at 25.
408. Id.

409. Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation a Processof Repair - or Separation?
An Empirical Study, and Its Implications, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 303-

04 (2002).
410. See id. at 303-04 (stating that the study was conducted on the outcomes
of legal disputes between parties where there was a "significant pre-existing

relationship" between the parties, as compared to, for example, a tort claim
resulting from an automobile accident, where the disputants were strangers
prior to the conflict).
411. Id. at 301.
412. Deloitte & Touche Survey, supra note 255, at 1.

413. Id. at 17.

2003]

(Pre) (As) sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration Contracts

641

percent) of the attorneys actually responded. 1 ' Seventy-two
percent of those responding had some experience with "ADR,"
although the type of experience (e.g., neutral or representative of a
party) and the particular ADR process involved was not clear. 1 '
Like so many other reviews, the survey really was looking at
alternatives to litigation, rather than binding arbitration as
such.416
A 1998 study by the Foundation for the Prevention and Early
Resolution of Conflict (PERC), Cornell University, and Price
Waterhouse, LLP targeted 606 general counsel and chief litigators
for Fortune 1000 corporations.417
Although the authors
acknowledged that negotiation is "the core of all dispute
resolution," they limited the study to mediation and arbitration,
processes involving neutral third-parties.418
Although the
respondents cited savings of money and time as compared with
litigation as reasons to select arbitration, part of the so-called
"myth," many identified serious concerns that they considered as
barriers to use of arbitration, including that the process is not
confined to legal rules, difficulty in appealing awards, and lack of
confidence in arbitrators. 19
Brunet's recent study of high stakes employment contracts
reviewed the actual contracts, but only to the extent those were
available.4 2 And, he does not attempt to survey the thinking of the
attorneys advising the clients and drafting the documents.'
Similarly, Christopher Drahozal's empirical research about
"unfair" arbitration clauses in seventy-five franchise agreements
used by leading franchisers consisted of his reviewing actual
contracts.'
Drahozal had access to these forms because
Minnesota requires franchisers to register before selling franchises
in that state.4 23 His careful analysis was from the standpoint of
"consumerized" arbitration, rather than agreements between
414. Id. at 1.
415. Id. at 2.
416. Id. at 1. See Golann, supra note 409, at 301-02 (stating ,that much of
the writing discussing mediation centers on the theme of the repair of the
parties' relationships, contrasted with the relationship that results from

parties involved in litigation).
417. DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, Cornell/PERC Institute on
Conflict Resolution, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Disputes - A
Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations7 (1998).
418. Id.
419. Id. at 25-26.
420. Brunet, supra note 5, at 109-10. Brunet points out that contracts
between CEO's and their employers are usually confidential, as well as the

Corporate Library website used to gather information about these types of
contracts, but not the negotiation process used to arrive at that result. Id.
421. Id, at 110.
422. Drahozal, supra note 92, at 721-22.
423. Id. at 722.
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commercial parties." 4
2.

Arbitrationin Construction

Most of the empirical research about arbitration thus far has
focused on the construction industry. Thomas Stipanowich, now
the president of CPR, has discussed and evaluated many of the
studies in a series of law review articles." 5 The focus of his article
"Rethinking of American Arbitration," in 1988 was a then recent
survey of opinions and attitudes toward arbitration under AAA
rules conducted by the ABA.426
However, it only solicited
responses from those who had experience as advocates and
arbitrators, 7 and only of those involved in the construction

industry.2

In a later article titled "Beyond Arbitration:

Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction
Industry," Stipanowich discusses the 1991 ABA Survey on Dispute
Resolution, which also solicited responses from members of the
ABA Forum on the Construction Industry.429
Out of 5,400
members who were sent the survey, 552 responded. 430
The
primary focus of the survey was to be mediation, mini-trial,
summary jury trial and non-binding arbitration rather than
binding arbitration. 4 11

And, while the 1994 Multidisciplinary

Survey on Dispute Avoidance and Resolution in the Construction
Industry was industry-wide, the only attorneys asked to respond

424. Id. at 700-20. Drahozal reports a more optimistic view about the
impact of binding arbitration on consumers than many other scholars as a
result of his research. Id. at 771-72. Most likely, there are other informal,
unpublished empirically based studies that solicit information from
transactional attorneys. For example, the Alternate Dispute Resolution
Committee of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers (ACREL), of which
the author is a member, sent out a questionnaire in 1994 to all members of the
College. This questionnaire was being used to assist the Committee in
planning future activities, including educational programs and a listing of
members who would be available as neutrals in mediation and arbitration.
425. See Thomson, supra note 211 (discussing an empirical study of
Minnesota arbitrators' actual practices during the pre-hearing, hearing and
award stages of an arbitration. See also Levin, supra note 46, at 160-61
(reviewing a pilot study conducted in 1990 by Professor Levin of executives
from sixty construction firms of attitudes about mediation and arbitration).
426. Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 432.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 453-54 (noting that 513 out of over 3000 members of the ABA
Forum Committee on the Construction Industry and the Construction
Litigation Division of the Litigation Section, who were polled, responded).
429. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration:Innovation and Evolution
in the United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 82
(1996) (discussing in depth the scope, design, implementation, and findings of
the 1991 survey).
430. Id. at 88.
431. Id. at 82.
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were members of the ABA Forum on the Construction Industry ' 3'
and the ABA Section on Public Contract Law. 33' The goal was to
collect data from those who had experience with a variety of
alternatives to litigation in the context of construction and from
the variety of players. The expectation was that the attorneys
polled would have had professional experiences with ADR,
including binding arbitration, as representatives of parties and/or
as neutrals. 3 '
E. The Survey
Although the original intention of this survey had been to
focus on commercial real estate lawyers, the focus soon turned to
The author considered
commercial transactional attorneys.
polling members of the Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), but
decided that the organization had a high number of members in
small firms and solo practices who would be more involved in
representing individuals rather than businesses. Also, the author
soon decided that fewer members of the ISBA would fit into a
distinct and separate category of "transactional" or "litigator"
because of the nature of their practices and many would be
involved in both aspects of practice. Another consideration was
made to poll members of the American Bar Association (ABA), but
that group consists of attorneys who primarily practice within
large firms and who would have more years in practice than the
desired survey target.
The author targeted the Chicago Bar Association (CBA) as an
appropriate group for survey. It is a voluntary membership bar
association with over ten thousand members who practice
primarily in Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. It has many
active practice committees plus a separate Young Lawyers
Committee (YLS) for those under thirty-five years of age or within
ten years of licensure. The YLS is organized into substantive
groups as well as subcommittees, including those on Real Estate
Law and Corporate Practice. Because the CBA does not charge
any additional amount of dues for participation in any particular
committee or subcommittee, members may belong to more than
one subgroup, choosing from separate practice areas depending on
their level of interest. On the other hand, the CBA does require
committee and subcommittee members to participate, at least by
attending monthly meetings, in order to remain in good standing
within those groups. It is this combination of easy access to
432. Id. at 128-29 (noting that 459 responded out of 5222 members polled).
433. Id. at 129 (commenting that only 69 members responded out of about
5000 members polled).
434. See id. at 132-33 (polling attorneys who specialize in business
transactions, rather than litigation, means that most do not have much
experience as neutrals and/or as representatives of parties).
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committees and subcommittees43 plus the requirement that
members participate minimally,436 which supports the choice of
respondents."'
The organization is dedicated to educating its
members about recent developments in practice, and membership
is sufficiently broad to yield a representative sample, at least of
lawyers in an urban setting. Moreover, members of several
committees were selected to receive the fifty-seven item, ten-page
questionnaire. 38' Two hundred thirty-one attorneys responded out
of the 1,194 surveyed.439
1.

Demographics of Respondents

The survey was structured to get demographic information.
The first question asked the participants to indicate the category
that "best" reflects the nature of their practice from among the
following: Corporate/Business; Personal Injury; Consumer;
Labor/Employment; Real Estate; and Estate Planning/Probate.
With the
exception
of Personal
Injury
and
Estate
Planning/Probate, which were not selected by anyone, at least one
respondent selected each of the categories.4
The second demographical query asked the participants to
indicate the percentage of their practice as "devoted to Litigation,"
"devoted to Transactions," and "devoted to Office Management and
Administration." 442 For each, respondents were asked to indicate
"none, 1-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, or more than 50%. ' 43 Also, the
survey solicited information about firm size,444 years in practice,445
435. This is as compared to the ABA and ISBA, which assess extra dues for
membership in their subcommittees.
436. There is no such requirement for ABA or ISBA committee membership.
437. Id. The author hoped to get a good response rate after having been

chair of the Real Property Law Committee.
Based on her years of
participation in that Committee, including three years as an officer and six on
the executive committee, the author realized that members are principally

involved in commercial real estate rather than residential. Even those in
subcommittees on Condominiums and Affordable Housing, for instance, have

clients who are developers and associations rather than individual owners. In
addition, the Illinois Residential Lawyers Association (IRELA) was not polled
because they specialize in practices involving residential transactions.
438. The survey was mailed with a stamped, return envelope to the following

committees: Agri-Business (23); Commercial Finance and Transactions (140);
Corporate Law Departments (169); Corporations and Business Law (405);

Environmental (107); Real Property Law (516); Young Lawyers Committees on
Corporate Practice (178); and Real Estate Law (182). The number of surveys

actually mailed is smaller than the total for all of the committees because
some members are in more than one committee.
439. See generally Hammond Survey, supra note 201.
440. Id. at question #1.

441. Id.
442. Id. at questions #2, #3, and #4.

443. Id.
444. See id. at question #5 (allowing participants to select firm sizes of solo,
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and familiarity with arbitration by education or discussion with
colleagues.446 These last demographic questions were designed to
help assess how transactional lawyers get information and
training about arbitration.
The survey characterized as "transactional" those attorneys
who indicated both that at least twenty-six percent of their
practice is devoted to transactions and that less than twenty-six
percent of their practice is devoted to litigation.4 7 This yielded 137
48
lawyers who were labeled "transactional.""
The survey also
separated those with no professional arbitration experience "9 from
those who had either been a representative of a party or an
arbitrator.45
2. TransactionalLawyers' Understandingand Expectations
For purposes of this article, data about the transactional
lawyers' understanding and expectations of arbitration law and
procedure was pursued, in particular whether they expected the
arbitrator must apply the rule of law,' whether the arbitrator will
provide reasons for the award' and whether they expected that, if
a party disagreed with the award, there was some part of the
process for an appeal or review. 53' Also examined was the extent to
1-15, 16-50, 51-100, and over 100).
445. See Id. at question #6 (allowing participants to select years in practice
of: under 5; 5-10; 11-15; 15-25; and more than 25).
446. See Id. at question #7 (asking "[hiave you discussed arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism with other lawyers?" and allowing participants
to select: never; a few times; frequently; and very frequently).

Question #8

asked "[did you take a course in alternative dispute resolution in law school?"
and allowed participants to select yes or no. Id. at question #8. Question #9
asked "[have you attended any CLE programs, seminars or trainings on
arbitration since law school?" and allowed participants to select yes or no. Id.
at question #9.
447. Id. at questions #2, #3. The survey group had 122 participants who
were in the "more that 50%" transactional practice category and fifteen who
were in the "26-50%" transactional practice category. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at questions #10-#13 (finding that ninety-four participants had no
professional arbitration experience).
450. Id. at questions #11, #18. Twenty-eight participants fell into this
category. Id. Fifteen participants had served as a representative only of a
party; five had served as an arbitrator only; eight had served both as a
representative of a party and an arbitrator. Id.
451. Id. at question #45 (noting that over seventy percent of participants
answered affirmatively).
452. Id. at question #50 (finding that between twenty-five and sixty-seven
percent of participants expected a reasoned award "always" or "usually.").
453. Id. at questions #51, #54, #57. The survey found that fifty-seven
percent of participants expected there was some appeal process; between
thirty-eight and sixty percent of the participants expected judicial review to be
available for arbitrator's failure to follow applicable substantive law or
because the arbitrator was mistaken as to the applicable substantive law; and
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which these lawyers reviewed documents "for real estate, business
or commercial clients" which included a binding arbitration
clause." 4 Further, this inquiry examined the extent to which they
included an arbitration clause in documents they drafted,455 how
often they modified arbitration clauses," 6 and how often they
"deleted or recommended to the client that the arbitration clause
be deleted in business, commercial or real estate related
documents.'"57
The results of the survey support the
aforementioned theory that transactional lawyers are reviewing
and suggesting modifications, including deletion, of arbitration
clauses even though they misunderstand certain basic
characteristics of arbitration. Moreover, although there were not
sufficient responses to make statistically valid inferences, those
attorneys with arbitration experiences were more likely to make
modifications in the arbitration clauses of documents they
reviewed for clients."'8 Empirical studies of the impact which
greater knowledge and experience with arbitration would have on
their advice to business clients about deleting or modifying
arbitration provisions awaits another day.459

between eighteen and thirty-eight percent of the participants expected that a
disagreeing party could demand a rehearing and decision in a court. Id.
454. See Id. at question #31 (allowing participants to select: never; once or
twice; a few times; frequently; and very frequently). Between fifty-five and
eighty-six percent of the participants selected frequently or very frequently.
Id. Participants who had no experience with arbitration selected these
categories fifty-five percent of the time, those who with experience
representing a party selected them eighty-six percent of the time, those who
had served as both an arbitrator and had experience representing a party
selected them seventy-five percent of the time, and those who had only served
as an arbitrator selected them sixty-percent of the time. Id.
455. See Id. at question #32 (asking for the frequency of arbitration clause
inclusion and allowing participants to select: "never, once or twice, a few
times, frequently, very frequently.").
456. See Id. at question #34 (asking for the frequency with which attorneys
modified the clauses and allowing participants to select: "never, once or twice,
a few times, frequently, very frequently.").
457. See id. at question #36 (asking for frequency of actual or
recommendation of deletion).
458. See, e.g., id. at question #34 (finding that forty-one percent of the
transactional lawyers with no arbitration experience said "never" when asked
if they modified arbitration clauses as compared to twenty-five percent of
those who had experience either as arbitrators or as representatives of
parties).
459. Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 432. Although there has been little in
the way of empirical research, Stipanowich reports a study of the construction
industry bar which shows that for cases involving over $250,000, fifty-five
percent of those surveyed favored a requirement that arbitrators make written
findings of fact. Id. at 469.
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V. DRAFTING SOLUTIONS CONSIDERED
Since arbitration provisions are treated as the result of
private contracts between parties, some commentators urge the
modification, and sometimes elimination of, pre-dispute
arbitration clauses to include requirements that arbitrators follow
a rule of law, provide reasoned awards, and permit judicial review
on grounds of error of law or fact as the way to meet the
requirements of knowing consent discussed herein.460 Typically,
CLE seminars reviewing arbitration for transactional lawyers end
with the suggestion that if a party, or her attorney, disapproves of
some features of arbitration, they may draft around those and
even resort to the "judicialization" of arbitration."' Such models
offer parties the advantages of arbitration, which have been
marketed heavily as promoting speed, privacy, and reduced
expense, while retaining the predictability and application of the
rule of law of litigation.46 However, it is unclear whether the
courts will enforce such individually tailored arbitration
agreements and it is unlikely that commercial lawyers who
counsel clients regarding transactions and the contracts that
support those transactions will know enough about the law of
arbitration to draft appropriate modifications. 63
Stephen Hayford urges lawyers to counsel their clients "at the
front end" on the desirability of arbitration and modification of the
process, 64 instead of relying on the confused law about vacatur of
460. See generally Cole, supra note 308.
461. Cole, supra note 85, at 1240. Growing suspicions about arbitration may
be the cause for disapproval of the 'folklore" version. Id. Brunet lists
characteristics of the judicialized model: routine discovery; motion practice;
substantive rules of law; written awards with findings of fact and conclusions
of law; and enhanced judicial review for legal error. Brunet, supra note 202,
at 45-46. See Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon,

62 BROOK. L. REV. 1433, 1445-46 (1996) (criticizing this trend in securities
arbitration, including enhanced discovery and pre-hearing motion practice, as
causing the expense of a typical arbitration to overtake the cost of a
comparable case in litigation).
462. See Brunet, supra note 5, at 128 (citing advertisements of the National
Arbitration Forum, a national institutional service provider, which requires all
arbitration awards to be based on the rule of law as an indication of market
acceptance of this modification of folklore arbitration); see also Brunet supra
note 202, at 54-55 (describing judicialized arbitration in AAA International
Arbitration Rules, CPR, and National Arbitration Forum).
463. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 85, at 1259 (concerning whether appropriate
standards for judicial review will be included in such modifications so as to
preserve the institutional integrity of the judiciary as well as meet parties'
approval).
464. See Hayford, supra note 38, at 503 (proposing a new paradigm for
commercial arbitration). The paradigm would require reasoned awards
explaining how the arbitrators applied the rules of law to the facts but would
limit vacatur to only "the most rudimentary guarantees of procedural and
substantive fairness, of the type embodied in section 10(a) of the FAA." Id.
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awards to guarantee "justice," which boils down to a "big error of
law" test.4"5 At the pre-dispute stage, parties and their lawyers too
often focus on the purported savings in cost and time that
arbitration offers only to ignore two other key factors: the lack of
reasoned awards which would indicate how arbitrators dealt with
questions of law and fact in particular cases, and the risk that the
awards produced will be "unacceptable" because they are perceived
as being the result of flawed reasoning.466
For example, parties may "carve out" of pre-dispute
arbitration provisions certain claims or claims beyond a certain
dollar amount.467 Richard Speidel argues that the Supreme Court,
in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University," ' permitted the parties to use a tailormade contract to arbitrate. 69' Thomas Stipanowich identifies a
trend to join "garden variety" arbitration with "more exotic
specimens" reflecting
the imaginativeness
of drafters.476
Nevertheless, there may be limits on what the parties can
construct, especially where it includes a provision for judicial
review of awards.47' Still, many commentators see provisions for
application of a substantive rule of law to issues in arbitration and
judicial review for errors of law as part and parcel of contract
arbitration that should be enforceable.47'
465. Id. at 474.
466. Id. at 498.
467. See Drahozal, supra note 249, at 586 (noting that it is fairly common to
see this in franchise arbitration agreements that he has reviewed).
468. 489 U.S. 468 (1989)
469. See Richard E. Speidel, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After
Mcmahon: Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1335, 1346 (citing cases following Volt which have enforced
limits on the scope of the arbitration; allowed selection of the administering
institution; and allowed the applicable procedural rules specifying details of
the arbitral process, including selection of the arbitrator and the situs for the
arbitration and the choice of the applicable substantive law). The Court
effectuated this decision by holding that the parties to an arbitration under
the FAA could choose state law, and thus include that state's arbitration law.
Id. at 1347-48. See also Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration
Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 225, 235-37, n.41 (setting forth cases illustrating
the many variations of issues subject to arbitration and the rules under which
the arbitration will proceed).
470. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 833.
471. See Rau supra note 469, at 252 (concluding that a federal court cannot
be required to apply the procedural rules of a state court when reviewing an
arbitration award). The court went on to state that an attempt to force a
federal court to review an award with arbitrary rules would be likened to
"flipping a coin or studying the entrials of a dead fowl and, as such, may not be
enforcable even under a contract model." Id.
472. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 203, at 735 (noting that, given the
Arbitration Act's strong policy of empowerment of the parties to arbitration,
Congress should enforce the arbitration agreement); cf. Kevin A. Sullivan, The
Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
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However, critics of enforcing enhanced judicial review clauses
argue that adding these requirements will just make arbitration
the same as litigation and they advocate no such modifications of
the process, even in individual cases.4" Moreover, it is unclear
whether parties may provide for judicial review of arbitration
awards.47 There currently exists a split among the federal circuits
on this issue."'
The concern about whether the FAA, in
preempting state law, would permit enforcement of a judicial
review for error of law provisions, was expressed by the drafters of
the Revised UAA when they did not include a statutory sanction of
an "opt-in" device.476 Additionally, if parties may not contract for
judicial review, then a contractual requirement of the arbitrator to
follow the rule of law477 and to provide reasoned opinions will have
little meaning.
VI. CONCLUSION

Even if the terms and rules of the arbitration may be changed
by the parties, due to the misunderstanding of transactional
attorneys as to basic aspects of arbitration, the pre-dispute,
binding arbitration provisions of their clients' agreements are not
Under the Federal ArbitrationAct, 46 ST. Louis L. J. 509, 549 (2002) (noting
that parties should not be able to expand judicial review by agreement because
it will create a second form of adjudication). See also Brunet, supra note 202,
at 48-49 (analyzing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) and First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) as confirming contract model).
But see Speidel, supra note 469 at 1347 (arguing that the principle of the Volt
case expands the FAA's grounds for judicial review and vacation of arbitration
awards to those selected by the parties);
473. See generally Sullivan, supra note 472. C.f. Cole, supra note 85, at 1262
(comparing use of judicial review of arbitration awards to requests by all
parties for vacatur of trial court orders). She points out that there is no
empirical study as to whether requests for more court involvement wastes or
conserves scarce judicial resources. Id.
474. See Brunet, supra note 5, at 129-30 (listing examples of contracts
between CEOs and S&P 500 firms which include provisions for judicial review
of arbitration awards).
475. See Robert D. Taichert, Conflicting Decisions Raise New Questions
About Judicial Review , DISPUTE RESOLUTION TIMES, April-June 2002, at 5
(noting that the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit cited the differing
opinions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in holding that the arbitration rules of
the FLL did not allow parties to alter judicial process through private
contract); see also Cole, supra note 85, at 1250-62 (finding current judicial
analyses of parties' requests for expanded judicial review unsatisfactory and
posits a two pronged test: 1) whether the statute permits expanded review and
2) whether expanded review threatens institutional integrity of the judiciary).
476. Andrew D. Ness, Revised Uniform ArbitrationAct of 2000 Makes Only
Incremental Changes, available at http://www.constructionweblinks.com/
Resources/IndustryReports Newsletters/April_8_2002/uniformarbitration_
act.htm (last visited April 28, 2003).
477. Levin, supra note 46, at n.86.
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really "consensual."
Much has been written about malpractice by attorneys who
do not advise clients to consider using ADR.478 Yet, transactional
attorneys who misunderstand arbitration may commit malpractice
when they advise their clients about using arbitration and when
they draft and modify pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
The
Reporter Comments to early drafts of the Revised UAA, which
would have permitted parties to contract in the arbitration
agreement for judicial review of errors of law, 479 expressed a
concern that lawyers would always add a provision for judicial
review to prevent a malpractice charge. 4" Rau, who characterizes
the lack of a requirement of a reasoned award to be only a "default
rule," reported that he knew of no empirical study that reversed
the default rules of no reasoned awards, no rule of law and no
judicial review. 48' However, he refers to CPR's Non-Administered
Arbitration Rules "where they do reverse the usual presumption
by opting for a reasoned award."482
Only if the arbitral process itself becomes more transparent
will transactional lawyers be competent to advise their business
clients as to whether they should agree to arbitrate future
disputes and under which model of the process."' Consent to
arbitration by business parties, as more generally with consumers,
employees, and franchisees, requires knowledge which current
practices preclude. Enhancing transparency about the process can
be achieved by making reasoned awards the default rule. Detailed
notice provisions explaining the basic differences between
arbitration and litigation should be a part of business agreements
with pre-dispute arbitration clauses, as much as they should be
required in contracts between parties with uneven bargaining
power.484 More honest marketing is necessary, especially by
institutional providers. These marketing efforts should be geared
toward attorneys and highlight the real advantages and
478. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A
Proposal that the Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to
Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183 (1999). See also "Lawyers Too Seldom Consider
ADR, GCS Say: Those Who Don't Use ADR Won't Be Around for Long,"
ILLINOIS LEGAL TIMES, June 1997 at 23. (noting the trend that outside counsel
are being expected to suggest ADR more often).
479. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
TENTATIVE DRAFT NO.3,
§ 19(b),
Oct. 9 1998, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uarba/arb1098.htm (last visited May 4,
2003).

480. Id. at n.147.
481. Rau, supra note 175, at 537 (1997).

482. Id. at n.184.
483. The contractual model of arbitration should be made a part of the FAA
and should serve as the policy behind the interpretation of that statute by the
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.
484. Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 897.
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disadvantages of arbitration. Thus arbitration, as compared with
litigation, mediation, and the likely settlement of cases submitted
to litigation, would help educate, rather than merely "sell" lawyers
on the process.
Of course, this would require that much more empirical
research be conducted to produce useable information-empirical
research on the myriad of cases that now may be subject to
arbitration-and on more than simply the attitudes of arbitrators.
Facilitation and support for such research by the big players, like
the AAA, is necessary at this point. It has been nearly a decade
since the completion of the most recent AAA and ABA sponsored
research on this subject. Moreover, that research was limited to
construction industry disputes.
With more information comes better educated attorneys, both
in the law school setting and in continuing legal education. 4 15 With
a developed competency on the law of arbitration and appreciation
of the process, transactional attorneys can assist their clients in
giving consent to arbitrate, or not.

485. See Stipanowich, supra note 53, at 917 (recommending that legal
educators teach more effectively about arbitration).

